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Introduction 
Automation has contributed substantially to the sustained improvement of aviation safety by 
minimizing the physical workload of the pilot and increasing operational efficiency. 
Nevertheless, in complex and highly automated aircraft, automation also has unintended 
consequences.  As systems become more complex and the authority and autonomy (A&A) of the 
automation increases, human operators become relegated to the role of a system supervisor or 
administrator, a passive role not conducive to maintaining engagement and airplane state 
awareness (ASA). The consequence is that flight crews can often come to over rely on the 
automation, become less engaged in the human-machine interaction, and lose awareness of the 
automation mode under which the aircraft is operating.  Likewise, the complexity of the system 
and automation modes may lead to poor understanding of the interaction between a mode of 
automation and a particular system configuration or phase of flight. These and other examples of 
mode confusion often lead to mismanaging the aircraft’s energy state or the aircraft deviating 
from the intended flight path.   
Authority, in the context of aircraft operations, refers to having the right, power, or requirement 
to execute a process associated with a function or action.  Autonomy refers to the capability of an 
agent (human or mechanical) to perform functions/actions independent of other agents. This 
effort focuses on pilot awareness of those subsystems that are afforded authority and autonomy 
(A&A) to change aircraft states such as trajectory, modes, power settings, configuration, and 
status.  Examples of subsystems include autopilot, autothrottle, flight guidance, flight 
management, fuel management, autotrim, and thrust reverser. 
ASA is a subset of more global situation awareness (SA) of flight operations that would include 
environmental factors such as traffic, terrain, and weather.  It is an emergent cognitive construct 
that pilots develop and maintain over time by observing various instruments and displays within 
the flight deck and integrating this with their mental representation of expected states based on 
training and flight experience.  Airplane State Awareness is a complex emergent cognitive 
construct within the pilot’s mind that: 
• Involves attention, mental models, knowledge base, display annunciations, AC state, and 
evolving situations [1]; 
• Is impacted by workload, fatigue and stress—as well as situation complexity, system 
complexity[2]; and  
• Includes a mental representation that evolves (and devolves) over time—with both 
negative and positive feedback loops between system displays and pilot SA. 
Many incidents and accidents are related to pilots losing awareness of the modes of subsystems 
with A&A, also known as mode confusion or automation surprises. Air traffic controllers also 
form a representation of airplane state awareness for all instrument flights operating in their area 
of responsibility; however, their airplane state awareness is generally limited to speed, altitude, 
and separation from other aircraft, consistent with the scope of their responsibility, their limited 
workload bandwidth, and the capabilities of their surveillance systems.  It is worth noting that 
none of the incidents/accidents reviewed involved improper air traffic control (ATC) monitoring 
or guidance.  Further, ATC is not currently required to maintain state awareness of aircraft 
systems with A&A.  Accordingly, the current approach is tailored to pilot awareness. For current 
aircraft operations, pilots are responsible for operating the aircraft and ATC is responsible for 
maintaining separation of the aircraft. Pilots often use automation to improve performance and 
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efficiency of the aircraft but this can sometimes result in inadvertent conflicts between intended 
performance and actual performance of the aircraft due to poor situation awareness of the 
automation’s mode (mode awareness) or incomplete understanding of the automation’s authority 
and autonomy.  In these cases, the pilot is responsible for monitoring the performance of the 
automation to assure it performs as intended and to reclaim authority should it not perform as 
expected, or otherwise “de-couple” per its design logic.  This paradigm has worked well and has 
been demonstrated to be safe for many situations – due largely to well-established validation and 
verification processes (V&V) for systems and procedures, as well as pilot training per 14CFR [3] 
and its associated guidance material, advisory circulars, etc. Representative examples of such 
accidents/incidents are given in Table 2. 
It is well known that any process controller (e.g. a pilot) has to maintain an accurate and up to 
date model of the process being controlled (the aircraft). In control theory, this is termed the 
process model and in human factors, it is generally referred to as a mental model. There is thus 
two-way feedback between the pilot and aircraft to keep the pilot’s mental model synchronized 
with the airplane’s system model.  A common theme among incidents and accidents is that the 
pilot’s mental model of the aircraft state became de-synchronized, i.e. the pilot’s mental model 
of the aircraft’s state did not accurately reflect the actual state. The pilot’s mental models were 
inaccurate or incomplete due to a lack of information or poor understanding of the information 
they were provided. In 2008, the Loss of Control Joint Safety Analysis Team, chartered by the 
Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST), also identified 50 aviation incidents occurring over 
a period of the previous five years involving energy state management and automation mode 
awareness [4].  In almost all cases, the flight crews lost awareness of what the automation was 
doing or was not able to manipulate the automation to resolve the incident.  In every case, crews 
were unable to return the aircraft to the desired flight path in a timely manner.   
This situation will likely be exacerbated by the increased levels of automation, system 
complexity, and operational requirements for NextGen operations [5]. For example, the 
accuracy, precision, and data interchange requirements of NextGen operations such as Required 
Navigation Performance (RNP) and Interval Management (IM) will impose substantially higher 
information processing demands on the flight crew. They will increase cooperative engagement 
with controllers and require greater precision and responsiveness from the control automation 
than current-day operations. The increased flight crew responsibilities NextGen will require 
advances in automation that can support more precise operations, can adapt dynamically to 
changing situations, and can exercise more authority and control on the flight deck. Flight deck 
user interfaces must support the dynamic transition of both the authority to exercise aircraft 
controls and the autonomy to act independently between pilots and flight deck automation. As 
research indicates, automated systems increase the complexity of human-automation interaction. 
The potential for accidents due to unanticipated automation behavior and resultant loss of aircraft 
state awareness will similarly increase. These transitions and interactions have significant safety 
implications, as surreptitious or frequent transitions may compromise flight crew awareness of 
aircraft state.  
While preliminary work in computational models of pilot awareness have been developed for a 
circumscribed problem space—taxiway errors—the state of the practice will not support scaling 
up to the broad category of aircraft state awareness within dynamic, full-mission operations.  
Aircraft state awareness, including authority/autonomy (A&A) awareness, cannot be reliably 
modeled or estimated for complex, dynamic situations. Currently, state awareness must be 
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explored through human in the loop (HITL) evaluations.  However, exhaustive HITL evaluations 
to identify A&A awareness issues would be impractically costly and time-consuming, so any 
new methodology must include a means to identify test cases to support selective HITL 
evaluations. 
Current validation and verification (V&V) processes include neither HITL evaluations nor V&V 
of requirements related to aircraft state awareness (i.e., situational awareness by the crew). Such 
awareness includes the current internal state of the aircraft and systems during nominal and off-
nominal scenarios. System-level requirements are typically validated through analysis, which is 
driven by processes documented by SAE ARP-4754 [6]  and its later revision SAE-4754A [7], 
SAE ARP-4761 [8], to satisfy AC 25.1309 [3]  none of which include HITL evaluations.  
Further, introducing the nearly infinite variations of human cognitive states under stressful 
conditions produces a combinatory explosion of possible scenarios to be validated and verified.  
Current V&V practices include selecting only a small number of nominal cases that are tested 
until failure or success.  For future V&V processes, the challenge is to define a subset of off-
nominal conditions and scenarios that are manageable from a schedule and cost perspective 
while insuring sufficient V&V coverage to satisfy the airworthiness regulations. This process 
will require a revamped approach to V&V that systematically generates requirements related to 
pilot aircraft state awareness, including HITL evaluations, and which leverages advanced 
simulation capabilities to verify acceptable levels of human factors (HF) constructs, such as pilot 
aircraft state awareness across boundary cases for A&A transitions. 
The need to address this issue was confirmed by the recent PARC/CAST Flight Deck 
Automation Working Group (FDAWG) report which identified pilot awareness of system states 
and improved V&V processes as outstanding needs, as illustrated by the following 
recommendations [9]: 
• Recommendation 2-- Autoflight mode awareness-- confirms that the pilot awareness 
continues to be compromised by overly-complex autoflight modes. 
• Recommendation 5-- V&V for equipment design-- explicitly calls out need to improve 
processes and method of V&V to address pilots need to respond to non-normal situations 
on highly-integrated avionics systems, confirming our working hypothesis. 
• Recommendation 6- Flight Deck System Design-- identifies an ongoing need to enable 
pilot awareness of system behavior after failure of another system.  
Statement of Work Tasks 
This report is organized into four main sections corresponding to the tasks described in the 
statement of work (SOW).  
Task 1:  Reviews current processes used by the industry to conduct V&V activities to assure that 
airplane state awareness is maintained by flight crew in cases where automated systems have 
been delegated the authority to change airplane state.   
Task 2:   Discusses a more rigorous and comprehensive methodology for the verification and 
validation of A&A-management constructs that minimizes the potential for loss of airplane state 
awareness by flight crew and air traffic control (ATC). Within this method, the role of linked 
ground-air simulation capabilities is also evaluated and discussed.  
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Task 3: Describes a generic cost/benefit analysis methodology that would provide decision 
support to help engineers consider what combination of testing elements, simulated and 
otherwise, would adequately and efficiently investigate ASA issues for A&A-management 
constructs.   
Task 4:  Describes an approach to determine simulation requirements to support HITL 
evaluations of pilot awareness of complex subsystem states involving A&A management. The 
approach includes: 1) identifying hazardous scenarios, 2) identifying fragile human-system 
interaction points that could compromise awareness and 3) considering the span of modeling and 
simulation environments that may be used to examine scenarios prior to operational service. 
Current Processes Used by the Industry 
Current V&V practices related to aircraft state awareness were surveyed.  Researchers reviewed 
FAA Advisory Circulars (AC), Federal aviation regulations (FARs), and NextGen operational 
concepts.  Review of these documents quickly revealed that the existing regulations thoroughly 
address the V&V of automated systems, components, and their integration; however, the same 
guidance does not exist when evaluating the system’s influence on the operator’s performance, 
or the operator’s influence on the system’s performance.  For this reason, regulatory documents 
from other domains were reviewed in an effort to understand if and how other industries address 
V&V of human-operated systems.  The findings from four domains including FAA, DOD, NRC, 
and NASA, revealed that although all the domains invoke human factors requirements, human-
system interaction is generally not part of the V&V process.  
Systems Certification Guidance and Standards 
The certification framework for systems (hardware and software) is built around CFR Title 14 
(hereafter 14CFR) requirements. Figure 1 shows the general process flow and the applicable de-
facto standards of current certification practice and are described in Table 1 along with how they 
are invoked in certification projects. Note that many of these are invoked simply by being 
required by the FAA divisions listed. These standards relate to 1) system development, 2) safety 
assessment and 3) design assurance of system hardware and software. These documents provide 
guidance on acceptable means of compliance to 14CFR but other methods may be acceptable to 
the certification authorities if proposed by an applicant. Details of all activities and deliverables 
to be fully compliant are not shown in interest of focusing on the key steps; these can be found 
within the documents referenced. The scope here is to give an overview and not a full descriptive 
narrative. In each case there is a direct equivalence between US and European editions of these 
documents. These are denoted by SAE/RTCA document numbers and corresponding EuroCAE 
documents numbers. We refer only to the US editions here for brevity. 
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Safety Assessment Process Guidelines & Methods 
(ARP 4761)
System Development Processes
(ARP 4754A)
Hardware Development 
Life-Cycle (DO-254)
Software Development 
Life-Cycle (DO-178B)
High Level Requirements
For Intended Aircraft 
Functions
Aircraft 
System 
Development 
Process
Hardware 
Lifecycle 
Process
Software 
Lifecycle 
Process
Operational 
Environment 
Definition
Safety, Performance 
and Interoperability 
Requirements
System 
Design
Functional 
System
Hardware 
Requirements
Software 
Requirements
Implementation
 
Figure 1 – Certification Process Flow and Applicable Standards 
Some revisions of these documents are underway or have been recently completed but are not 
yet formally invoked by 14CFR through Advisory Circulars. SAE ARP-4761 is under revision 
by the SAE S-18 Committee and is scheduled for completion in 2014. RTCA released DO-178C 
in late 2011 [10]. Although not shown in Figure 1, RTCA DO-200A also applies in cases where 
software (or hardware) utilizes data coming from off-board sources (e.g. navigation databases). 
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Table 1 – Systems Development Standards 
Reference Description Applicability Invocation 
SAE ARP-4754A Guidelines for 
Development of Civil 
Aircraft and Systems 
Highly-Integrated or 
Complex Aircraft 
Systems 
No generic invocation at 
this time. Selectively 
invoked for some 
certifications through either 
customer request 
(contractual) or IP/CRI 
process. 
SAE ARP-4761 Guidelines and 
Methods for 
Conducting the Safety 
Assessment Process on 
Civil Airborne Systems 
and Equipment 
Aircraft, Systems and 
hardware components 
SAE ARP-4754 (if 
invoked), commonly 
accepted as means to 
support AC25.1309-1A 
compliance 
AC 25.1309-1A 
or AC 23.1309-() 
Describes various 
acceptable means for 
showing compliance 
with the requirements 
of 14 CFR section 
25.1309(b), (c), and 
(d). 
Applies to any system on 
which compliance with 
any of those requirements 
is based. 
Section 25.1309(b) and 
(d) specifies required 
safety levels in qualitative 
terms, and requires that a 
safety assessment be 
made.  
 
FAA ANM-110 
RTCA DO-
178B/C 
Software 
Considerations in 
Airborne Systems and 
Equipment 
Certification 
Provide guidelines for the 
production of software for 
airborne systems and 
equipment that performs 
its intended function with 
a level of confidence in 
safety that complies with 
airworthiness 
requirements 
TSO, AC 20-115B 
Order 8110.49 Software Approval 
Guidelines 
This order guides Aircraft 
Certification Service 
(AIR) field offices and 
Designated Engineering 
Representatives (DER) on 
how to apply RTCA/DO-
178B, “Software 
Considerations in 
Airborne Systems and 
Equipment Certification,” 
for approving software 
used in airborne 
computers. 
FAA AIR-1 
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AC 20-115B Radio Technical 
Commission for 
Aeronautic, Inc. 
Document RTCA/DO-
178B 
Calls attention to 
RTCA/DO- 178B, 
“Software Considerations 
in Airborne Systems and 
Equipment Certification,” 
issued December 1992. It 
discusses how the 
document may be applied 
with FAA technical 
standard order (TSO), 
authorizations, type 
certification (TC), or 
supplemental type 
certification authorization 
(STC). 
FAA AIR-130,  Aviation 
Safety - Aircraft 
Certification Service, 
Aircraft Engineering 
Division 
RTCA DO-254 Design Assurance 
Guidance for Airborne 
Electronic Hardware 
complex custom micro-
coded components or 
programmable logic 
devices (PLD), such as 
Field Programmable Gate 
Arrays (FPGA) and 
Application Specific 
Integrated Circuits 
(ASIC) 
Note: that DO-254 was 
written to address all 
hardware items, but the 
FAA through AC 20-152 
has limited applicability 
to PLDs. 
AC 20-152, TSO’s 
AC 20-152 RTCA, Inc., Document 
RTCA/DO-254, Design 
Assurance Guidance 
For Airborne 
Electronic Hardware, 
Applies to manufacturers 
and installers of products 
or appliances 
incorporating complex 
custom  micro-coded 
components with 
hardware design 
assurance levels of A, B, 
and C. 
FAA AIR-100, Aircraft 
Engineering Division, 
Aircraft Certification 
Service 
Order 8110.105 Simple And Complex 
Electronic Hardware 
Approval Guidance 
This order explains how 
FAA can use and apply 
RTCA/DO-254, Design 
Assurance Guidance for 
Airborne Electronic 
Hardware, when working 
on certification projects.  
FAA AIR-100, Aircraft 
Engineering Division, 
Aircraft Certification 
Service 
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The close collaboration between the FAA and industry working groups creates consistency 
within the V&V processes that OEMs employ; however, the role of human factors engineering is 
not specifically considered in the formalized systems certification process and these topics are 
given little or no attention in these standards.  As such, human factors issues such as ensuring the 
system promotes situation awareness, minimizes the potential for human error, reduces 
workload, etc., are not addressed by the industry in a consistent manner.  Likewise, the 
employment of human factors engineers and incorporation of human factors best practices is 
highly variable across OEMs.   
Traditionally, if human factors engineers are used, they are primarily used in the hardware and 
software development cycles.  However, we suggest that earlier involvement of human factors 
engineers in the overall process has distinct advantages.  Involving human factors engineers in 
the early design processes, including defining operational environments and high level functional 
requirements, ensures good human factors design practices are incorporated throughout the 
process. 
The process described above defines the operational environment from an engineering 
perspective when a user-centered perspective may be a necessary complement, or more 
appropriate.  The reductionist nature of the engineering process often loses sight of the end user, 
focusing more on the functional requirements of the technology rather than the goals and 
objectives of the user.  By defining the operational environment from a user-centered 
perspective, the goals and objectives of the user can be clearly defined and the functionality 
needed to safely achieve those goals is consistently addressed during product design and 
development. Engaging human factors experts in the requirements development phase is another 
opportunity to ensure good human factors practices are incorporated throughout the program.  
Traditionally, human factors personnel have had limited opportunity to influence high level 
requirements, but this practice may be changing as more regulators begin to include human 
factors requirements in their regulations.  The creation of high level human factors requirements 
will naturally lead to human factors involvement in formal validation efforts as well.  The 
inclusion of human factors personnel in defining the operational environment, developing high 
level requirements, a participation in verification and validation efforts early in the program is an 
important step to ensuring human factors constructs such as situation awareness, workload, 
usability, etc. are addressed throughout the design. 
Human Factors Engineers can also contribute to the safety assessment process by ensuring that 
user-centered perspective is used throughout the various analyses (e.g., proper assumptions 
regarding the pilots and their tasks are used during the analysis).  In addition, human factors 
experts can conduct human reliability analyses to evaluate the system’s design and identify 
factors that influence human performance.  Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is closely related 
to Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) methods developed to identify and quantify potential 
failure modes of complex systems.  HRAs apply engineering reliability analysis to the human 
operator to identify potential opportunities for human error and quantify the probability of their 
occurrence.    
Ideally, hardware and software design processes would involve a collaborative team of 
designers, flight test pilots, and human factors engineers working together to ensure the design 
enables sufficient flight crew awareness.  Flight test pilots provide operational expertise while 
human factors engineers provide detailed knowledge of the psychological foundations of 
situation awareness and the associated design attributes that enable it.  However, the level of 
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human factors involvement varies amongst OEMs.  Some OEMs may not employ human factors 
experts, while others may have entire departments staffed with dedicated human factors 
engineers.  The result is inconsistencies in the application of the human factors knowledge and 
best practices during design and development as well as the level of scrutiny applied to the type 
of evaluations conducted during V&V.  Some OEMs may conduct comprehensive human factors 
evaluations, while others may simply rely on the expert judgment of flight test pilots.  
The requirements recently published in AC 25.1302 [11] are the first step in ensuring human 
factors constructs like situation awareness are addressed during the design process.  However, 
additional efforts should be made to provide industry guidance for the inclusion of human factors 
engineering practices within the existing system certification guidance and standards shown in 
Figure 1.  
V&V of Airplane State Awareness 
The development of verifiable human-systems requirements related to situation awareness, 
usability, and workload can be challenging as it requires quantification of a set of measurable 
criteria that represent these constructs. While the empirical literature concerning these constructs 
is well known, the challenge of converting them into verifiable engineering requirements is a 
daunting one. 
If the intention of V&V is to assure situation awareness, then valid and efficient testing depends 
on clear notions of what situational awareness is and how it can best be tested.  Although 
numerous definitions of situational awareness have been proposed, Endsley's definition [1], "the 
perception of elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the 
comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future," is firmly 
established and widely accepted.   
Aircraft state awareness is an emergent cognitive property that pilots build and maintain over 
time by observing various instruments and displays within the cockpit.  For example, autopilot 
mode awareness is maintained by observing annunciations displayed on primary flight displays, 
flight director panels and the FMS MCDU. The best practices for the design and display of 
autopilot mode annunciations is outlined in AC 25.1329 [12] which includes recommendations 
for annunciating automation modes, mode changes, and mode transitions. Additional guidance 
regarding the optimal location of the displays and indications can be found in AC 25.1321 [13]. 
For human factors engineers, the purpose of verification is to determine that the design conforms 
to regulations and enables the crew to successfully perform the necessary tasks.  Advisory 
Circular 25.1302 [11] describes five methods to show compliance with the requirements, though 
for situation awareness, the only applicable methods are evaluations and tests (the only 
distinction between the methodologies is that tests require a conforming product and system 
interface).  Though not prescribed in the advisory circular, human factors engineers typically 
assess situation awareness using one or more of the methods described below:  
• Subjective Ratings – participants rate their perceived situational awareness [14][15]. 
• Direct Query - situation awareness of the participants is assessed by questioning their 
knowledge of particular aspects of the situation [16][1]. 
• Performance-Based – participants’ situation awareness is inferred based on their actions 
and responses to stimuli [17][18]. 
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Each of these methods has inherent advantages and disadvantages and the rigor of evidence 
increases from subjective ratings to direct query and performance based methods.  Selection of 
the appropriate method is dependent upon several factors including the novelty, complexity, 
level of integration, and intended function of the system.  It is likely that a combination of 
methods will be needed to demonstrate a system promotes situation awareness.  For example, 
early in the design process subjective measures may be used to select between various 
prototypes.  While later in the design process, as the fidelity of the prototypes increase, direct 
query and performance based methods provide more experimental rigor and validity.  For many 
human factors issues and requirements, such as workload and situation awareness, there is no 
good substitute for the rigor of results from human-in-the-loop studies designed to evaluate 
integrated, full-mission crew performance under normal and off-nominal situations. 
Survey of Industry practices for V&V of Human Factors Constructs 
V&V of human factors constructs is a common concern and problem across a broad range of 
industries that are characterized as safety critical, strictly regulated and incorporate strong 
interactions between automated systems and human users/operators. A survey of the common 
current practices and related standards and guidance across the aviation, space, defense and 
nuclear power sectors is described below. 
Federal Aviation Administration  
Best practices for V&V of aircraft systems and their components are alluded to in several FAA 
documents, including regulations (e.g. §25.1301, §25.1309, etc.), advisory circulars (e.g. AC 20-
115, AC 20-152, etc.) and Policy Memos (e.g., PS-ANM111-2001-99-01). These documents 
address the V&V of hardware and software components and their integration but do not address 
the systems influence on human performance. 
Certification of autopilot systems on transport category airplanes is outlined in §25.1329 and 
TSO-C9C.  TSO-C9C invokes industry recommendations for the design of autopilot systems 
described in SAE-402B.  Test and evaluation criteria for certification of autopilot systems is 
described in AC 25.1329-1B.  These criteria are primarily concerned with the effects of autopilot 
failures on the airplane. The most recent revision to AC 25-7A, “Flight Test Guide for 
Certification of Transport Category Airplanes,” also defines some evaluation criteria for 
determining whether the autopilot is performing as intended.  Policy Memo PS-ANM111-2001-
99-01 was issued in 2001 to address incidents and accidents involving pilot-autopilot 
interactions.  The memo provides additional design guidelines to improve flight crew mode 
awareness, specifically for speed and attitude awareness during operations when the autopilot 
system is activated. 
Unfortunately, none of these documents address authority- and autonomy-management issues 
from a human-centered perspective.  Likewise, none address the issue of mode awareness, a 
common cause of accidents and incidents involving the autopilot [19].  The guidance cited above 
implies that that flight crew awareness is maintained by ensuring that the systems perform as 
designed and provide the necessary operational cues, annunciations, and alerts.  Unfortunately, 
accident reports are rife with examples in which flight crew lost situational awareness even 
though they were complying with operational procedures and the aircraft was operating as 
designed and certified [4].  Awareness is an active, complex cognitive process that resides in the 
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mind of the flight crew; the successful presentation of “situation awareness” information on the 
flight deck is a necessary but not sufficient condition for pilot awareness. 
The documents cited above support traditional system engineering processes and address the 
V&V of integrated systems as well as their hardware and software components.  However, they 
do not address the systems influence on human performance.  The commonly held assumption is 
that, ensuring the safe and reliable operation of system will result in the safe and reliable 
performance of the operator. Unfortunately, this system-centered approach does not accurately 
account for the operator’s role in the overall safety of the system.  While systems engineers often 
see the human operator as a source of error and uncertainty, and thus seek to minimize their 
interaction with the system, they fail to recognize that positive human intervention is often the 
key to recovering from a system failure.  Thus, the systems-centric approach often leads to the 
overuse of automation and interfaces that fail to keep the operators engaged; which in turn, 
results in a loss of situational awareness.  Current V&V practice dictates tests run until failure, 
but humans can fail to maintain airplane state awareness and then subsequently recover.  The 
dynamic interaction between pilot performance, mental model, and system annunciations 
requires a new methodology to handle the explosion in the problem space.  Fortunately, the FAA 
recognizes this bias towards system-centric process and has made strides to release human 
factors regulations intended to promote a more human-centered design approach. 
Regulatory guidance for addressing human factors issues are distributed among several advisory 
circulars, policy memos, orders and notices.  Most recently, the FAA (and EASA) has published 
AC25.1302, which is intended to minimize pilot error and ensure usability of crew interfaces 
(FAA, 2013).  Of particular interest, 25.1302 (b)(3) states that:  “flight deck controls and 
information intended for flight crew use must enable flight crew awareness of the effects on the 
airplane or systems resulting from flight crew actions.”  The guidance within AC25.1302 
suggests that applicants seeking certification will need to verify that cockpit technologies ensure 
crew awareness but does not provide specific guidance for its verification.  
Aviation Industry Documents Pertinent to Delegation of Authority and Autonomy 
The FAA has acknowledged issues pertaining to delegation of authority and autonomy and has 
taken steps to address them in the documents below: 
• 14 CFR 25.1329 (“Automatic pilot system”), which contains FAA’s standards for 
certifying automatic pilot systems on transport category airplanes;  
• 14 CFR 25.1335 (“Flight director systems”), which contains FAA’s standards for 
certifying flight director systems on transport category airplanes; and  
• AC 25-11A “Electronic Flight Deck Displays” 
• AC 25-1322 “Flight Crew Alerting” 
• Advisory Circular (AC) 25-1329-1A (“Automatic Pilot Systems Approval,” dated July 8, 
1968), which describes an acceptable means by which compliance with the automatic 
pilot installation requirements of § 25.1329 may be shown. 
Department of Defense 
It can be argued that the science of human factors engineering was founded by the military 
during World War I to address new demands placed on soldiers as weaponry became more 
mechanized and complex.  In the decades since, technological advancements of military systems 
have continued to challenge and evolve the science.   
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The engineering process used to develop military systems is defined in DoD 5000.02 which 
invokes processes described in industry standards such as ISO 15288 and IEEE 1220.  DoD 
5000.02 and the related industry documents describe a five-stage systems engineering process 
which includes: 1) Concept Development, 2) Technology Development, 3) Production, 4) 
Utilization, and 5) Retirement.   The concept development phase defines the operational 
requirements that will be used to validate the final product. During engineering development, the 
supporting system, subsystem, and component level requirements leading to preliminary design 
and critical design will be iteratively verified through various types of testing and analysis during 
materialization, integration, and testing.  The high-level requirements applied during the concept 
development phase are primarily defined within MIL-STD-1472 [20]. 
MIL-STD-1472 has defined human engineering requirements for military systems, subsystems, 
equipment and facilities since 1989.  Its thoroughness has made it a widely cited standard for 
human factors professionals in almost every industry.  Now in its seventh revision, the standard 
has been updated to address contemporary issues posed by complex systems including 
psychological constructs such as human-automation interaction (Section 4.12) and situational 
awareness (Section 5.12).  Much like the guidance provided by industry regulators, the 
requirements in MIL-STD-1472 are intended to serve as high level requirements to be applied to 
various products to be acquired by the DOD.  
The inclusion of situation awareness within MIL-STD-1472 was only included in the most recent 
version which was released in 2012 so the implications for the V&V process are not well known.  
However, the US Coast Guard is reportedly planning to conduct comparative evaluations in 
which human performance on existing systems will serve as the baseline for comparison against 
all new systems.  For example, situation awareness provided by a new radar system onboard a 
Coast Guard Cutter will be compared to the situation awareness of the existing system.  If the 
new system is determined to be equal to or better than the existing system, it will be accepted.  
This is similar to FAA certification requirement that new systems support human performance 
that is no worse than that supported by a related, certified system. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission   
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) 
evaluates human factors engineering (HFE) programs of applicants for construction permits, 
operating licenses, standard design certifications, combined operating licenses, and for license 
amendments. The human factors reviews conducted by the NRC verify that accepted HFE 
practices and guidelines are incorporated into the applicant’s HFE program. The HFE review 
includes the design process, the final design, its implementation, and ongoing performance 
monitoring. 
NUREG-0700 [21], much like MIL-STD-1472 and NASA-STD-3000, provides high level 
requirements and detailed human factors design standards to evaluate nuclear power plant 
control stations.  Psychological constructs such as situational awareness, workload and usability 
are referenced throughout the document.  For example, the high level requirement for situational 
awareness is described in the general display guidelines:    
1.1-11 Display of Goal Status  
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The information system should provide for global situation awareness (i.e., an overview of the 
status of all the operator's goals at all times) as well as supplying details about the current specific 
goal.  
NUREG-0711 (NRC, 2003) details how to conduct verification and validation of advanced 
nuclear power plant designs provided in NUREG-0711.  NUREG-6393 provides supplementary 
guidance for NUREG-0711 and dedicates large sections to the measurement of psychological 
factors.  In particular, section 5.6.2.3.1 is dedicated to defining situation awareness as well as 
describing techniques to measure it and the advantages and disadvantages of each technique.   
While the NRC literature is the most comprehensive in addressing V&V of psychological 
constructs, much like MIL-STD-1472, it has been put to little practice as no new nuclear 
facilities have been built in over two decades.  It should be noted that guidance provided in 
NUREG-6393 and the evaluation of psychological constructs are anticipated to pose many 
challenges to the V&V process [22]. 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Since the inception of the space program, NASA has made deep investments in understanding 
human performance and incorporating good human factors principles.  NASA publishes several 
documents to ensure proper HMI principles are incorporated into their programs.  For example, 
NASA-STD-3001 [23]  is a widely used standard that documents HMI considerations and 
requirements.  Despite the focus on human performance and HMI, the standard does not address 
psychological constructs of human performance like situational awareness.   
Recent human-system integration requirements written for the Constellation Program [24]  and 
the commercial space systems [25] include functional requirements for workload and usability.  
These documents are unique to other industry regulatory documents in that the requirements 
specify acceptable thresholds for workload and usability and specify how the requirements will 
be verified.  Interestingly, the introduction for the chapter on display format design (user 
interfaces), states that the “Display formats must provide situational awareness,” yet there is no 
formal requirements (shall statements) for situational awareness within the document. 
NASA’s human factors requirements are unique in their prescriptive nature in that they specify 
success criteria as well as the methods and tools to be used during the V&V process.  It could be 
argued that NASA very rarely commissions a new spacecraft and when they do, very few are 
built; therefore, the repercussion of prescriptive requirements is less burdensome than other 
domains.  Nonetheless, these types of requirements do pose a certain amount of programmatic 
risk that must be acknowledged and accounted for.  Most notably, the methodologies defined in 
NASA’s requirements to measure workload and usability are subjective, making them more 
susceptible to biases of the participants and inherent variability of human behavior.  The inability 
to mathematically predict the outcome of human-in-the-loop evaluations may create unease 
among program managers and increase the risk of the program failing verification evaluations. 
To be clear, these issues are not insurmountable, but they do require vigilance and close 
collaboration between the developer and the evaluator. 
Authority Sharing Cue Sufficiency 
Based on our review, current industry practices do not specifically and systematically address 
awareness of authority/autonomy modes.  While AC25.1302 requires certified flight deck 
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systems to “enable flight crew awareness”, it is too vague to realistically address the subset of 
awareness related to authority and autonomy sharing or management.  
To investigate this, several incidents/accidents were selected for review to identify potential gaps 
in the V&V process, see Appendix A: Accident/Incident Reports.  Official accident reports and 
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) reports were reviewed to understand the involvement 
of pilot state awareness.  It is our conclusion that the automation mode cues operated as designed 
in all incidents/accidents.  In spite of this, it appears that pilots understanding of the airplane state 
did not reflect the actual state, often contributing to the accidents.  This was also the case for 
incidents reported in ASRS such as altitude busts (ASRS 113722, 1989), as well as automation 
surprise research [26][27].  In these cases, it was confirmed that the interaction and display 
between the flight crew and the flight deck did not sufficiently support awareness of A&A 
sharing. 
Results and Discussion 
The challenge of maintaining situation awareness in work domains that include complex 
automated systems is a ubiquitous one. Government agencies across several domains have 
recognized the issue and are attempting to address it by incorporating human factors principles 
into their regulations and system engineering requirements.  The nature of this challenge was 
confirmed during a Human Factors and Ergonomics Society (HFES) Panel discussion chaired by 
the Honeywell team in October 2013
1
, where it was recognized that existing verification and 
validation practices are generally not intended to address the system’s influence on human 
performance or the influence of human performance on the system, and that new engineering 
V&V processes may be needed to accommodate human factors requirements. 
 Regulations intended to address psychological constructs (e.g., situation awareness, workload, 
usability, etc.) create new opportunities and challenges.  On one hand, the regulations provide 
authority for human factors engineers to enforce good human factors principles.  On the other 
hand, such regulations pose a certain amount of risk to the V&V process which must be 
acknowledged and accounted for. 
Verifying and validating human factors requirements can be costly and time consuming to 
perform.  They require additional analyses to be performed, mockups and simulators to be built, 
and ideally, the employment of human factors specialists.  In addition, V&V of psychological 
constructs like situation awareness require human-in-the-loop evaluations which incur additional 
complexity and cost.  The additional time and expense associated with human factors evaluations 
are often unwelcome burdens to program managers, especially given the potential risk the 
requirements pose.  
Human factors requirement also create requirements traceability challenges for the hardware and 
software designers.  The high-level requirements defined in the various regulatory documents 
discussed above are decomposed into functional requirements and applied to hardware 
components and software specifications in a manner that can be traced from each element back 
to the high level requirement.  However, human factors requirements, especially those 
addressing psychological constructs, can only be realistically/meaningfully tested at an 
integrated level.  This poses challenges for the deconstructive V&V process at the lowest levels 
                                                          
1
 SD5 – VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION: HUMAN FACTORS REQUIREMENTS AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
(http://www.hfes.org/web/HFESMeetings/HFES_2013_AM_Program.pdf) 
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of decomposition.  This is especially the case for constructs such as situational awareness, which 
emerges from the perception, comprehension, and projection of elements within the environment 
[1].  For instance, how does one design a test to verify that an individual icon, light, button, etc., 
improves situational awareness or reduces workload?  At some point in the decomposition 
process, psychological constructs are no longer verifiable creating traceability issues for 
requirements managers and V&V engineers. 
The evaluation tools and methodologies used during verification are an additional challenge.  
Performance-based evaluations are viewed to have the most external validity but are typically 
cost prohibitive and reserved for final test of only the most critical systems.  Most often, the tool 
used to assess psychological constructs are subjective measures as they offer the greatest 
efficiency. Tools such as NASA-TLX [28], Bedford Workload Scale [29], SART [14], SA-
SWORD [15], etc. are all commonly used tools; however, they are subjective measures and thus 
prone to the inherent variability of human judgment and biases.  Methodology issues combined 
with relatively small sample sizes used during the evaluations can impose a great deal or risk to 
the verification and validation of a product.  Thus, a poorly designed questionnaire, misapplied 
tool, or even a disapproving test pilot can jeopardize an evaluation and the entire V&V effort. 
Regardless of the methodology used, or the outcome, human factors evaluations are often viewed 
with skepticism by traditional engineers based solely on statistical issues.  At their best, 
behavioral statistics can provide statistical significance levels of 10
-3
 which pales in comparison 
to engineering evaluations that measure reliability on the order of 10
-7 
or 10
-9
.  This sense of 
scale can make it difficult to convince authorities that results from a human factors evaluation 
will generalize to the equivalent performance during day-to-day operations. 
Enhanced Methods and the Role of Testing 
In the previous section we reviewed the current practices for systems development, the relevant 
guidance material, and V&V practices in aerospace regarding ASA and A&A management. A 
common feature of current and upcoming human factors (HF) V&V practices is lack of 
formalism. They rely mostly on the expert judgment of users (pilots) and engineers to establish 
what activities (i.e. verification scenarios) are required, what pass/fail criteria are appropriate and 
when those activities can be considered to be adequately complete. Typically, HF engineers are 
not included in the development and validation of formalized, system requirements or to the 
development of verification test cases except in an ad hoc fashion. Whilst this is adequate for 
evaluating new systems; however, it would not seem adequate for evaluating the system’s effect 
on human performance or influence of human performance on the system.  
This section comprises an analysis to determine the role of linked ground/flight testing during 
V&V of new A&A constructs. The analysis begins with a discussion of a generalized structured, 
formalized, and repeatable process for evaluating A&A issues. This process augments current 
methods and provides a more rigorous and comprehensive methodology for the design of such 
systems (including the HF requirements). It is within the context of this presumed process, that 
the role of modeling, simulation, and testing is discussed. 
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Examples of ASA Related Accidents/Incidents 
The list of incidents in Table 2 is representative of incidents where loss of airplane state 
awareness was a contributory factor. We focus on events where on-board system failure was not 
a direct, proximate cause. In some cases system failure (those marked with a *) contributed to the 
loss but the loss was avoidable had the crew had proper ASA and thus possibly could have taken 
timely corrective action. Incorrect, missing or delayed actions can, in part, be attributed to a lack 
of understanding by one or more crew members of the automation’s current state. This loss of 
ASA is variously caused by loss of environment awareness, mode confusion, automation surprise 
or loss of aircraft state awareness. 
Table 2 – Aircraft Incidents Related to ASA 
Incident Airplane State Awareness Issue 
China Airlines Airbus A300B4-622R, on 
approach to Nagoya Airport, Japan, April 1994 
[30] 
Crew was unaware of autoland mode 
*Predator B UA Crash, Nogales, AZ, April 2006 
[31], [32] 
Crew was unaware that the fuel supply had been 
accidentally cut 
American Airlines Flight 965 B757 near Cali, 
Bogota, December 1995[33][34] 
Crew was unaware that that the FMS had put them 
on an offset parallel track 
Comair Flight 5191 Bombardier CL-600-2B19, 
Attempted Takeoff from Wrong Runway, 
Lexington, Kentucky, August 2006 [35] 
Crew were unaware they had lined up for takeoff on 
a wrong runway too short for takeoff 
Northwest Airlines A320 Flight No NW188, 
N374NW, Overflight of Minneapolis Airport, 
October 2009 [36] 
Crew were unaware that 1) the ATC radio channel 
was mistuned, 2) ATC could not contact them and 3) 
they were unaware they had over flown a waypoint 
Colgan Air Flight 3407 Bombardier DHC-8-
400, Loss of Control on Approach under icing 
conditions, Clarence Center, New York, 
February 2009 [37] 
Crew did not report icing conditions so Colgan AOC 
was unaware of icing conditions and provided 
incorrect approach speed recommendation 
Kenya Airways B737-800, Douala, Cameroon, 
May 2007[38]  
Crew was unaware of a gradually increasing roll 
angle 
*Air France Flight AF 447 Airbus A330-203 
loss of control, Rio de Janeiro to Paris, Atlantic 
Ocean, June 2009 [39] 
Crew were confused by ‘unreliable airspeed’ 
warnings and ignored or were unaware of standby 
indicators 
*Turkish Airlines Boeing 737-800 Crashed 
during approach, near Schiphol Airport, 
Amsterdam, Holland , February 2009 [40] 
Crew did not react in a timely manner to premature 
autothrottle thrust reduction following failure of one 
radar altimeter 
*XL Airways delivery flight Airbus A320-232, 
Accident off the coast of Canet-Plage, France, 
November 2008 [41] 
Crew were unaware that 2/3 AOA sensors were 
frozen and of the resulting AFCS mode 
Many cases of ‘altitude bust’ in ASRS where 
FMC cannot fly to constraints, busts flight plan 
constraints, e.g. ASRS 113722, 1989 and 
[26][27] 
Crew did not comprehend the mode logic operation 
of the autoflight system 
The common conclusion from these is that additional system requirements could have improved 
crew ASA and thereby possibly avoided or mitigated the resulting loss. The question then arises; 
what additional requirements could have been specified during the early stages of system 
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definition and how could those requirements have then been verified during detailed system 
design and evaluation?  
Several tools and methodologies may be used during verification of psychological constructs.  
The most commonly-used techniques are summarized below.   
Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) 
HRAs apply engineering reliability analysis to the human operator to identify potential 
opportunities for human error and quantify the probability of their occurrence. HRAs can be used 
as a design tool or an accident investigation tool.  Prospective HRAs are conducted during the 
design phase and is used to assess the probability of an event happening and allow designers to 
improve the design accordingly.  Retrospective analyses evaluate systems that have already been 
designed or evaluate events that have already occurred in order to determine the likelihood that 
something could or should have happened.  Prospective and Retrospective analysis use the same 
methodology.  Retrospective analyses are used for accident investigation and therefore have the 
advantage of hindsight in that they know what the outcome was.  Likewise, the conditions of the 
accident and the design of the systems are already established.  Prospective analyses are used to 
make guide systems design decisions.  During systems design the analysts may be faced with 
many unknowns and therefore and must rely on the foresight of the analyst to predict potential 
failure modes and estimate error probabilities.  Since this report is intended to address the 
certification of new products, the reviews below focus on prospective HRAs. 
HRAs also provide the ability to explore and analyze different high-risk scenarios.  This is 
especially desirable when considering “edge of the envelope” scenarios which may be highly 
improbably but extremely critical situations or conditions which could be difficult or impossible 
to evaluate with human-in-the-loop (HITL) experiments.   Iterative use of HRAs can be used to 
determine the sensitivity or “brittleness” of systems and tasks to human error and potentially 
identify opportunities to make them more resilient.    
While the use of HRAs provides advantages, they do have limitations and pose potential pitfalls 
if the methods are not performed correctly or the results are used inappropriately.  Most notably, 
the quantification of human error probabilities should be interpreted with caution. One of the 
primary arguments against the use of HRAs is that the resulting probabilities do not accurately 
reflect actual human error rates or system safety. Another concern is that HRA methods assume 
that humans fail in the same manner as systems or their components.  Considerable evidence has 
shown that this is not the case [42]. 
Another criticism of HRA methods is that they can only analyze failures that the analysts can 
foresee. Unfortunately, humans are the most complex and least understood part of any 
engineered system, susceptible to a more diverse range of failure modes than any other 
component, making it impossible to foresee and analyze every possible failure.   
Finally, HRA methods see humans as a source error and conclusions from analyses often seek to 
eliminate or minimize the human’s interaction with the system.  This bias fails to acknowledge 
that positive human intervention can prevent a system from failing, recover a failed system, or 
manage a failed system.  HRA methods could provide insight into “edge of the envelope” 
scenarios, as long as its results are interpreted with caution and used in conjunction with 
complementary methods. 
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The Use of Subjective Measures 
Most often, the tool used to assess psychological constructs are subjective measures as they offer 
the greatest efficiency. Tools such as NASA-TLX, Bedford Workload Scale, SART, SWORD, 
etc. are all commonly used tools; however, they are subjective measures and thus prone to the 
inherent variability of human judgment and individual opinion.  Methodology issues combined 
with relatively small sample sizes can impose a great deal or risk to the certification of a product.  
Thus, a poorly designed questionnaire, misapplied tool, or even a disapproving test pilot can 
jeopardize an evaluation and the entire certification effort. 
Current guidance does provide some correlation between the expected outcome of a failure and 
the probability of such a failure, e.g. AC 25.1309 [43].  For safety critical systems, a loss of 
function probability of 1E-9/fh is the guidance figure. It must be remembered that this is a 
guidance figure for engineering purposes and the real airworthiness requirement is that a single 
point failure shall not, under any conceivable circumstances, lead to a catastrophic loss. We 
therefore view the standard probabilistic methods for safety assurance as necessary but not 
sufficient and think that a process orientated towards discovering ‘conceivable circumstances’ to 
be more promising for the discovery of HF system requirements. 
In the development of any system, a well-worn process of developing the requirements and then 
verifying that the implementation has correctly implemented all of them is generally followed. 
The ‘develop requirements’ step also needs a process to establish that the requirements so 
developed are complete and consistent to an adequate extent. This latter step is often referred to 
as requirements validation or validation for short. Thus validation and verification are distinct 
and separate activities with different objectives. These principles are enshrined in the 14CFR 
airworthiness regulations and the structure of their associated guidance documents as we 
reported previously. 
In the development of hardware and software for safety critical systems, it is apparent that 
validation is a critical step upon which all subsequent design and verification activities depend. 
An examination of various accident reports, such as those in the previous section, indicates that 
at least some can be attributed to faulty or missing requirements rather than faulty design or 
verification. A subset can be traced to unforeseen human error which in turn may be regarded as 
faulty or missing HF requirements that should be levied on the system itself. 
System-level Human Factors Requirements 
With regard to certification, 14 CFR 25.1302 (c) includes a situation awareness requirement that 
states: “flight deck systems shall enable flight crew awareness”.   This is not specific enough to 
address the challenges related to airplane state awareness. While proposed new system 
requirements could technically be covered by existing, generic requirements, the level of detail is 
not sufficient for use in design and evaluation.  To augment this generic requirement, a proposed 
approach should include generating more detailed system requirements based on a wealth of HF 
research into automation awareness in particular.  For example: 
All flight deck systems given a degree of authority and/or autonomy for changing the trajectory 
of the airplane, shall: 
• Annunciate all normal and abnormal disconnects and disengagements (does not fail 
silently). 
• Prominently annunciate all mode transitions. 
22 
 
• Provide indication of most recently changed mode setting. 
• Provide immediate feedback if pilot is providing opposing control input to autoflight 
system. 
• Flight mode annunciation panel shall efficiently convey relevant mode states and be 
comprehensible “at a glance” 
• Where practicable, identify reasons why mode activation is not allowed. 
System level requirements of this type would not suffer from the challenges of most HF 
performance requirements which tend to be unverifiable or rely on subjective measures. 
Mechanized Approaches 
In addition to these analytic HF methods, a comprehensive approach should include more 
mechanized approaches that systematically and objectively evaluate A&A based on HF 
principles related to ASA.  Current practice relies heavily on the judgment of system engineers 
and test pilots to identify unsafe scenarios and actions; however, their analysis can be biased by 
their expertise leading them to discount scenarios that may be catastrophic but highly 
improbable.  Mechanized approaches dispassionately evaluate system characteristics, ignoring 
the relative frequency of certain system states and without human biases.  For example, [44] 
suggests a model checking method to identify scenarios where there is likely to be a mismatch 
between the pilot’s mental model and airplane state for the ‘kill the capture’ automation surprise 
in the MD-88 autopilot.  A possible mechanized approach is to identify test scenarios where 
disconnect is likely and map out the mode logic and all of its transitions in a state machine 
representation for a given automated system and then ‘run’ a set of pilot mental model heuristics 
against it to identify violations.  Experts would develop heuristics that are representative of pilot 
expectations and biases while being diagnostic to identify areas of disconnect.  The assumption 
is that, even under ideal conditions, some automation logic or mode transition behavior could 
violate pilot expectations.   
Computed-based Modeling Methods 
When studying human-system interaction, the number of variables that can influence human 
performance is often too large to allow empirical assessment of all the possibilities. This is 
especially true when studying complex systems or complex cognitive constructs like SA.  
Computer-based modeling of human performance has been proposed as an alternative method to 
HITL evaluations to help explore a vast problem space [45].  
Modeling tools and techniques have been applied to replicate and study various aspects of 
cognition including perception, motor control, learning, and decision making.  Modeling tools 
have also been developed to analyze and evaluate human performance during various tasks.  
However, most modeling methods have failed to successfully replicate the cognitive aspects of 
SA.  Likewise, task analysis models that are intended to evaluate work allocation often fail to 
model the dynamic nature of authority- and autonomy-management in the aviation environment.   
One modeling method is addressing this shortcoming by applying dynamic computational 
modeling to simulate work by multiple agents in complex dynamic systems.  Agents (human or 
mechanical) are modeled as responding to, and changing, their environment [46][47].  The 
authors describe their simulation as models doing work where work is defined as “purposeful 
activity of acting on, and responding to, the environment as required by the situation”. This work 
is performed by automated and human agents and involves both cognitive and physical activity 
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whereby agents evaluate the situation to select the appropriate sets of actions. Work is thus a 
response to the situation, with strategies chosen in response to the physical environment, the 
allocation of responsibility within the team; and agent status including expertise, the demands on 
the agent, and resources available to the agent such as time and information. As such, this 
methodology provides the ability to dynamically simulate A&A issues as situated within a 
dynamic environment driving and responding to human or mechanical agent activity[48]. 
Synergistic Modeling and Simulation 
We recognize that computer-based modeling of human behavior is very difficult and itself 
requires verification, therefore it can be advantageous to add multiple levels of simulation 
fidelity to the computer based modeling methods. This allows scenarios to be postulated, 
possible crew errors of timing, omission or commission to be postulated, initially analyzed 
through safety assessment methods and finally verified within a simulated environment. 
Throughout this process, additional requirements will emerge which can be considered for 
removal through equipment design change or mitigation through crew training or procedural 
modifications. 
A synergistic approach to evaluating ASA and A&A-management issues fuses two methods, 1) 
model-based design and safety analysis and 2) simulation within a simulation facility or group of 
linked facilities that include human-in-the-loop. Recognizing that simulator time can be 
expensive, this scheme puts as much as possible of the load into the lower cost computer-based 
environment and therefore maximize the productivity of the high level simulators. The general 
scheme proposed is shown in Figure 2. The process is iterative and may be started and stopped at 
any point depending on the level of assurance required of the system. 
The selection of model or simulator is specific to the hazard under investigation. It is the initial 
safety analysis that provides the initial hazards which are then refined by process iterations, 
employing the appropriate models and simulators as required. 
The use of models provides three key features; 1) it allows for the representation of rare events 
that could not be realistically or safely reproduced in test flying and 2) it permits the generation 
of test cases that can be presented to simulation facilities with multiple and arbitrary degrees of 
closeness to actual operations and 3) allows rapid iteration of multiple variables that may detract 
or contribute the pilots’ performance. Executing the models and scenarios within a simulation 
environment allows confirmation of the predicted effect and also generates test results that can 
be used to refine the models and create additional scenarios. 
The major benefit of this approach is that it builds on itself; system safety analysis can create 
rare event scenarios which in turn reveal missing requirements. By an iterative process, the 
model is extended and improved, new requirements are discovered and generated and 
appropriate test cases developed for use in later verification activities. 
Traditional system safety analysis methods such as the example PRA methods in ARP-4761 [8], 
now incorporated in 14CFR guidance, are somewhat weak in representing complex interactions, 
feedback, and a degenerating safety state that are typical of the rarer type of safety event as 
typified in the accidents we reviewed. The safety analysis step in this process should be extended 
with additional safety analysis (e.g. STAMP/STPA [49]) be performed in addition to the industry 
standard PRA. Further work is required to include HF considerations within the safety analysis 
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methods, since none of those presently known are capable of generating HF related system safety 
requirements. 
HITL SIMULATOR
SYSTEM MODELING
SCENARIOS
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RESULTS
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Figure 2 – Model Based Design and Simulation 
The notion of model in the above is quite general. In our parlance, a model is simply some 
representation of the object being modeled. By this definition, a model may be formalized 
mathematical construct such as a mode logic state machine, some representative hardware 
incorporating some elements of aircraft and airborne equipment such as a full motion simulator, 
or the aircraft and all its systems A safety model may represent the closed loop response model 
of an airspace procedure, e.g. ITP [50]. 
The generation of requirements through this process results in modifications to the design of 
equipment, procedures and training to eliminate or mitigate the potential for the occurrence of 
safety events. Such requirements include the HF cues provided to the crew to inform them of 
system state and the backup warnings should a crew action (or inaction) be incompatible with the 
system state, thereby driving the system into a hazardous state. This is the approach we 
recommend to infer crew SA since methods for direct modeling of crew SA constructs have 
proved problematic in the past. 
We note that expert judgment still maintains a place in this methodology since the iterative 
process cannot be known to be complete. The main benefit is that progress is made in 
incremental steps, documented along the way, each step building on the previous one. System 
modifications made as the process iterates are more easily rechecked as design proceeds without 
having to redo large parts of the safety analysis. Since the larger ‘systems’ will be in a state of 
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almost continuous development as NextGen continues to evolve, this methodology provides for 
system modifications to be easily re-checked for hazards without having to go back to ‘square-
one’ on each change. 
High Level Requirements for Simulation Facilities 
Simulation facilities need to be selected and configured to address specific hazards; there is no 
generic simulation specification that covers all possible hazards. The use of simulators is useful 
for confirmation that a given test case will produce a system hazard. Simulator is a broad term 
that encompasses the small and focused, e.g. a symbology simulator, to large airspace simulators 
that may include both ground based and airborne assets. The intent is that low level modeling 
tools would perform in ‘fast time’ and the complex and expensive ‘slow time’ simulators would 
be confined to a confirmatory role. 
The Figure 2 illustrates two basic classes of simulation facilities: 
• A computer based tool that executes a given model and provide results from given test 
cases. 
• A high-level simulator that represents a typical cockpit including pilots and external feeds 
of operational data. This class of simulator requires that it be presented with a test case in 
the form of a scenario definition. Such simulators may be “linked” either to other 
simulators, or to operational platforms (e.g. aircraft or ATC towers) 
A review of NASA and FAA data has located a considerable number of US facilities that offer 
high level simulation facilities. These are listed in Appendix C: Selected Simulation Facilities at 
FAA and NASA. The following are representative capabilities that are suggested but the subset 
of these required will be dependent on the precise problem being investigated. 
• Pilot symbology generator. 
• Formal methods analysis of state machine representations of a multi-LRU system, e.g. 
theorem prover, model checker, abstraction. 
• Full motion 6-DOF large transport cockpit with representative equipment, e.g. displays 
(EFB, SVS, HUD), mode control panel, standby instruments. 
• Weather data feed. 
• ATC communications utilizing voice and CPDLC. 
• Multi-target generator for TIS-B and ADS-B traffic data, live from airborne assets or 
from other linked simulation facilities. 
• Flight data, communications and voice recording. 
• Pilot, co-pilot eye tracking. 
• Fault injection to simulate functional failure of individual high level functions, e.g. blank 
displays, primary power loss, hydraulic pressure loss, sensor fault/icing. 
Anticipated Impact of Using Linked Ground/Flight Testing 
Although flight simulators are typically thought of as pilot training devices, they also play a key 
role in aircraft systems research and development (including V&V).  Simulators provide the 
unique ability to test the impact of a new system in a controlled environment and better 
understand the capabilities and limitations of a system before it is fully developed and deployed.  
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As complexity and level of integration of aviation systems increases, the role of simulators as 
tools within the V& V process will most likely increase. 
One issue that must be addressed is the level of fidelity the simulator must provide in order to 
address the testing objectives at hand.  The simulator must provide an adequate level of fidelity 
to replicate the critical aspects of the flight in order to ensure that the test findings generalize to 
the actual flight environment with an acceptable level of confidence.  If the goal of the simulator 
is to evaluate systems impacts on a pilot’s ASA, then it is essential to understand what perceptual 
and cognitive experiences the simulator must provide in order to elicit behaviors that may occur 
in the actual flight environment.  In the training domain, the generalization of behaviors from a 
simulator to the actual operational environment is referred to as transfer. 
Flight Simulator Fidelity 
The amount of simulator fidelity required to transfer behavior from one environment to the next 
has been debated since it first received attention in the beginning of the 20
th
 Century (See 
Thorndike and Woodworth, 1901; Judd, 1908 for early debates).  The debates have primarily 
focused on the types of fidelity a simulator can provide and their effect on learning and transfer 
of training.  The overall fidelity of a simulator is defined by four variables.  Physical fidelity 
refers to how closely physical components look and feel like the actual aircraft.  Visual fidelity 
most often refers to the realism of the environment when the pilot looks out the windows.  
Motion fidelity refers to the extent to which the motion forces of the simulator match those of the 
actual flight environment. Last, cognitive fidelity refers to extent to which the simulator engages 
the same cognitive processes (e.g., attention, workload, situational awareness, etc.) as the actual 
flight deck in an operational environment. 
Studying pilot awareness, or the loss thereof, presents several unique issues to consider when 
determining the level of simulator fidelity required. Situation awareness is a cognitive 
phenomenon that the pilot develops by collecting information from the environment and 
integrating into a cognitive model of the situation. Pilots may integrate information from a 
variety of sources. In terms of simulator fidelity, physical fidelity may be critical for determining 
how the location of information in the flight deck influences situation awareness as displays and 
controls not within the primary field of view may be attended to less often or may not be 
attended to during periods of high stress or workload.  In some scenarios the use of motion may 
help understand the role of proprioception in building or maintaining aircraft state awareness 
(e.g., attitude changes, turbulence, stalls, etc.).  Visual fidelity can be important for scenarios 
involving environmental factors (e.g., terrain, traffic, weather, etc.).  Last but not least, cognitive 
fidelity is of the upmost importance as situational awareness can be volatile and easily effected 
by stress, workload, attentional demands etc. 
There is a dramatic range of flight testing/simulation platforms, including PC-based desktop 
trainers, full motion certified simulators (e.g. Level D), modified operational aircraft, and 
network-based connected simulators that link operational aircraft to ground-based simulators. In 
general, ground-based simulators allow a level of safety and experimental control along with 
reduced cost; while flight evaluations provide higher fidelity but at a higher cost with less safety 
and less experimental control. Both airborne test aircraft and high-fidelity simulators can 
engender realistic levels of pilot workload and stress and expose the pilot to realistic 
environmental dynamics, thus maximizing cognitive fidelity.   
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Cognitive Fidelity 
To highlight the importance of cognitive fidelity, under realistic workload levels, pilots are less 
likely to monitor the output and state of automated systems, thus increasing likelihood that their 
awareness de-couples from the actual system state. For this analysis, maximizing cognitive 
fidelity would be a benefit since it is the dimension that most impacts ASA in operations.  Some 
high level cognitive factors that contribute to loss of ASA include: 
• Under sampling sources that provide awareness (narrowing of attention and degradation 
of task management) due to: 
• Low workload (loss of vigilance) 
• High workload 
• Stress 
• Distraction 
• Inadequate mode annunciation indications. 
• Complex displays that are difficult to parse quickly 
• Low salience of mode change indications relative to flight deck visual 
environment. 
• Inaccurate/incomplete mental model (pilots infer airplane state based on their experience 
and/or understanding of automation mode logic). 
• Automated system mode logic complexity & intuitiveness 
• Pilot knowledge/skill base (e.g., level of proficiency, overall knowledge, practical 
experience, familiarity with aircraft, exposure to unusual situations, etc.). 
• Conformity of flight deck interface 
To illustrate the importance of cognitive fidelity, we consider the narrowing of attention 
phenomena.  It is well known that workload and stress can narrow pilots’ attention which could 
increase the likelihood that they fail to fully sample the flight deck environment to maintain 
airplane state awareness, as illustrated by Figure 3.  Accordingly, varied and realistic workload 
and stress levels could be considered a highly beneficial element for HITL evaluations, to be 
weighed against the cost to create a test setup that provides adequate realism.  
 
Figure 3: Attention under Stress 
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This also illustrates the risk of failing to identify an ASA issue due to limitations in the test 
setup.  If the testing scenarios do not adequately induce workload and stress, test pilots could 
exhibit higher levels of awareness than would be expected under realistic conditions.  This could 
lead the testers to inappropriately conclude that there are no ASA issues with the evaluated 
design. Consequently, the issue may not be identified until later in the development and 
certification process, incurring greater re-design, development, and certification schedule and 
monetary costs. Worse yet, the issue could be first identified as the result of an incident or 
accident once fielded, incurring very expensive re-design efforts, damage to reputation, and 
exposure to legal liabilities. 
Costs and Benefit for Testing Options 
A cost/benefit analysis is integral to decisions regarding the required level of test environment 
fidelity.  Once you have identified system elements involved with A&A management that are of 
concern and should be tested, a cost/benefit analysis can provide some guidance on how to 
configure the testing setup. This can help streamline the process by scoping the testing elements 
that are integrated to be commensurate with testing objectives, in this case the cognitive fidelity 
related to managing A&A and maintaining ASA.  
Costs include the development time, evaluation schedule, personnel and equipment, and 
operating costs such as fuel. The key advantage to linked facility testing is that it provides 
another layer of fidelity; specifically, the ability to evaluate large scale A&A issues and their 
effect on the air traffic system.  This will be needed to fully evaluate and test NextGen 
technologies and operations where roles and responsibilities between pilots and ATC will 
become more co-dependent and traffic is anticipated to be more dense.  To enable comparison of 
different testing setup options, some quantification or categorical assessment is required for the 
cost and benefits elements.  In general, cost is operationalized as a categorical, rough order of 
magnitude estimate of dollars costs of operating costs of, personnel time to integrate with, 
accessibility to simulation capability, and project schedule impact. Another testing cost is 
exposure to unsafe conditions.  While it is difficult to quantify this in terms of dollar costs, we 
can assume it is desirable to avoid expose testing personnel and the public to unsafe operating 
situations. 
With regard to estimated costs, Honeywell’s experience is that flight test operations cost range 
from $3.5K to $5.0K an hour depending on the air frame, while FAA certified Level D simulator 
costs approximately $2.0K an hour.  These do not include the substantial personnel cost for 
designing, executing, and analyzing results from tests.  For PC-based simulators, the operating 
costs are negligible but the modification and integration costs could be similar to flight tests.  
Table 3 captures rules-of-thumb estimates of relative costs for different testing platforms. 
 Flight Test High Fidelity Simulator PC-based Simulator 
Operating Costs High Medium Low 
Personnel Costs High Medium Low 
Schedule Cost High High Low 
Table 3: Estimate of Relative Cost Impact 
Likewise, some benefits, such as support of certification efforts, can also be estimated in terms of 
dollars savings and possibly reduced time to market.  This assumes that an applicant would be 
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expending financial, personnel, and time to conduct similar evaluation and documentation efforts 
if not done in the proposed V&V evaluation and testing process. There is a less direct mapping 
between cognitive fidelity and monetary estimates.  In including testing elements germane to 
ASA for a given system or subsystem, the primary, direct benefit is to increases confidence that 
the testing findings are ecologically valid, and thus can be generalized to real-world operational 
settings.   
A less direct mapping could be between an unrealized benefit, from a course of action not taken, 
that could become a cost should the applicant fail to find an ASA issue and continue to mature 
the design.  In this scenario, the issue would be found later in the certification process or after 
fielded, thus dramatically increasing the cost to address this.  The worst case, and less direct 
mapping, would be an ASA issue that contributes to some incident or accident, resulting in 
damage to reputation, legal liability risk, and possible survivor benefits. 
Relevance to FAA AC 25.1302 
The potential for certification benefits from this proposed new V&V process has increased 
following the issue of FAA AC 25.1302: Installed Systems and Equipment for Use by the Flight 
crew on May 3, 2013 [11].  This AC includes design guidance explicitly for supporting flight 
crew awareness as well as specifying how applicants can demonstrate compliance.  The guidance 
within the AC includes an emphasis of the use of HITL evaluations as a means of showing 
compliance with the human factors related requirements.   
Examples of such design guidance include the following: 
• Uncommanded mode changes and reversions should have sufficient annunciation, 
indication, or display information to provide awareness of uncommanded changes of the 
engaged or armed mode of a system (§ 25.1302(b)(3),5-6: System Behavior: C: System 
Functional Behavior: 3:b:4). 
• The automated system must, per § 25.1302(b) (3), support flight crew coordination and 
cooperation by ensuring shared awareness of system status and flight crew inputs to the 
system, if required for safe operation (5-6: System Behavior: B: System Function 
Allocation: 7: c).Section 25.1302 (b) requires flight deck controls and information 
intended for the flight crew use be provided in a clear and unambiguous form, at a 
resolution and precision appropriate to the task.  The flight deck controls and information 
must be accessible and usable by the flight crew (e.g. including all lighting conditions 
and all phases of flight) in a manner consistent with the urgency, frequency, and duration 
of their tasks, and must enable flight crew awareness, if awareness is required for safe 
operation, of the effects on the airplane or systems resulting from flight crew actions (5-
1: Overview: f: 2). 
When weighing the costs and benefits of different testing elements, one should keep in mind that 
some options, especially those including conformal flight deck interfaces, could support 
compliance per AC 25.1302.  However, conformal flight test hardware and software are not 
available until late in the design cycle during which design changes can be quite costly. 
HITL evaluations should be documented to serve as a means of compliance.  In some cases, 
testing involving conforming components (product/system, flight deck, and/or system interface) 
could also serve as a means of compliance.  However, given the range of evaluation scope 
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options and that conformity is not required; evaluations would likely be the most selected course 
of action and therefore a common benefit that need be considered. 
For those testing configurations that would meet the requirements for compliance, benefits could 
include reductions in certification duration and costs.  This assumes that most applicants would 
be conducting various HITL evaluations as part of their standard product evaluations processes, 
so this would then reduce the scope of certification tasks, thus reducing their duration and cost. 
Examples 
It is a common question as to what level of hardware conformance is sufficient for HITL 
evaluations.  For example, evaluating autoflight functionality would require feedback on the 
presentation of active autoflight modes on a Mode Control Panel (MCP).  It is an open question 
whether the exact A/C specific panel is needed or whether a software display-based virtual panel 
would suffice.  Human Factors experts within test teams would do a cost/benefit on the inclusion 
of conformal hardware panels, resulting in output that could resemble the following: 
Costs: 
• Schedule delay—until hardware panel is available 
• Integration cost—install hardware panel in simulator cab, integrate with simulation 
software 
Benefits: 
• Minimal increase in ecological validity between hardware panel presentation and virtual 
panel; software display panel, if in same location, would engender equivalent cognitive 
fidelity with regard to ASA as hardware panel. 
Conclusion 
• For ASA evaluations, the costs of hardware panel integration do not warrant the minimal 
benefits to ecological validity. 
Another question is whether the exact panel needs be within an airborne platform or in a ground-
based simulator. Given the relative simplicity of a MCP design, it is unlikely that airborne testing 
would be required to evaluate the panel itself.  However, if the test relates to dynamic airplane 
state awareness, presentation of MCP information is a necessary but not sufficient condition. The 
Human Factors perspective looks at it three ways 1) does it behave in a meaningful way, 2) is the 
signal detectable under conceivable operational environments and 3) is the signal clear and 
unambiguous. For this evaluation, ground-based simulator would be sufficient provided the 
testing scenarios include realistic levels of workload to assess whether the presentation of 
autoflight state satisfies 2 & 3.  
Table 4 depicts the outcome of a cost/benefit analysis for the MCP evaluation example.  The full 
table with assessments of factors, such as workload, distraction, and complex automation logic, 
can be seen in Appendix B: Cost/Benefit Analysis for MCP Testing Example.  The results of the 
assessment can be seen in the rightmost column which reflects the number of ASA-related 
factors on which the testing component has a medium or high impact. 
Testing Component Type Test Setup 
Option 1: 
MCP 
Cost 
Estimate 
# Med or 
High 
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Evaluation Impact 
Automation Simulation Test Software 
Platform 
R M 6 
Configurable All Glass 
Flight Deck Interface 
Test Software 
Platform 
R M 5 
Conformal flight deck user 
interfaces 
Test Software 
Platform 
O H 6 
Part-Task Simulation Test Scenario 
Element 
R M 5 
Full Mission Simulation 
(high fidelity in procedures, 
actors, and roles) 
Test Scenario 
Element 
  H 5 
Realistic Flight Deck 
Workload Support 
Test Scenario 
Element 
R M 4 
ATC Operator Station Test Hardware 
Platform 
  n/a 0 
ATM HIL Simulator Test Hardware 
Platform 
  n/a 0 
Conformal physical 
hardware interfaces 
Test Hardware 
Platform 
  M 1 
Desktop Simulator Test Hardware 
Platform 
  L 0 
High Physical Fidelity 
(displays, controls, AC 
dynamics) 
Test Hardware 
Platform 
  H 2 
Fixed Based Simulator Test Hardware 
Platform 
R M 3 
Motion Platform Test Hardware 
Platform 
  H 1 
Flight Data Test Data   H 0 
Airport conditions Simulated Test 
Scenario Element 
  M 0 
ATC Simulation Simulated Test 
Scenario Element 
  M 2 
ATM Simulation Simulated Test 
Scenario Element 
  M 0 
Traffic Simulator Simulated Test 
Scenario Element 
O L 3 
Voice Communications Simulated Test 
Scenario Element 
O H 3 
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Weather Simulator Simulated Test 
Scenario Element 
O L 3 
Connectivity to Remote 
Simulation Capabilities 
Connectivity O M 3 
Linked Air to Ground via AC 
Telemetry 
Connectivity   M 0 
Live Traffic Linked to 
Ground Station 
Connectivity   M 0 
Table 4: Results of Cost/Benefit Analysis for MCP Testing example 
For this example, the following test setup would result from the cost/benefit analysis: 
• Purpose: evaluating autoflight mode presentation on MCP 
• Simulation environment: ground, fixed-based, part-task simulator with configurable glass 
cockpit (e.g. NASA LaRC Integrated Flight Deck Simulator) 
• Testing scenarios:  induce realistic levels of pilot workload: 
• Traffic: option--simulated is sufficient 
• Weather:  option that could further increase workload 
• Two-crew setup:  include Crew Resource Management (CRM)  to induce 
workload overhead and AC state monitoring is pilot monitoring responsibility 
• Scope: focus on phases where there are mode transitions, such as take off and 
approach; include off-nominal scenarios identified by earlier hazard analysis, such 
as Go-Around, subsystem failures, etc. 
• Workload: realistic level 
 
Given the added complexity of resource dependencies and system integration, Linked air-ground 
testing will almost always increase the cost of a test, relative to either ground-based only and 
airborne only,  in terms of schedule, budget, resources availability, and personnel.  Across the 
range of HITL evaluations that can vary greatly in complexity and realism, a case could be made 
that for most ASA testing scenarios, ground-based simulation tests should be sufficient when 
considering the distributed capabilities available.  This is especially true given the conventional 
flight test setup which is highly constrained by safety restrictions, typically only expose pilots to 
nominal situations, and involve test pilots who are very familiar with the system under 
evaluation, if not part of the product team. This conventional flight test setup essentially limits 
the scope of benefits since ASA issues often occur at the edge of the operational environment, 
including subsystem failures, higher risk phases of flight, and pilot errors—all elements that are 
not available in flight tests.  Engineers have more latitude in ground-based simulators to simulate 
subsystem failures and induce off-nominal operations.  Given these factors, it is hard to imagine 
a cost/benefit analysis that favors linked ground to air testing for broad application. 
However, there are some noteworthy exceptions where classes of benefits have been identified 
for linked air-ground testing paradigm.  The following classes are worth consideration relative to 
cost of linking: 
• Support testing conditions to possibly enable certification credit for V&V artifacts 
developed during flight tests 
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• Introduce environmental elements, such as traffic and weather, with increased control and 
safety (e.g., FAA William J. Hughes Technical Center Target Generation Facility 
(WJHTC TGF). 
• Experimental control to manipulate test scenarios in ways that are impossible or 
impractical in the real world. 
• Virtual traffic generated by ground-based traffic simulator 
• Simulated weather 
• Manipulate ATC voice and/or data communications. 
• Increase safety margin by using ground-based simulated weather and traffic, 
exposing airborne test platform to fewer hazards. 
• ATM automation design evaluation 
• Airborne platform could support realistic evaluation by acting as intruder within 
live traffic, provide measure of control in generating alert conditions that would 
unlikely happen by chance with unlinked evaluation 
• Linking ground ATC test station (WJHTC Experiment Operator Station (EOS) to live 
traffic to evaluate new operator tools and displays): 
• Evaluation of real-time operational data from airborne platforms (e.g. energy 
state) on controller ASA 
• Highest level of realism of traffic dynamics and weather impact. 
• Unmanned Air System (UAS) within US National Airspace (NAS) evaluations 
• Manned airborne platform could link with ground control and simulation to 
provide critical safety oversight (line of sight),including remote control 
• E.g., UAS cargo flights in Class B airspace 
• Special case:  substitute simulated environmental reality to pilot via flight deck while 
obscuring out the window (OTW) view: 
• Limiting the field of vision of pilots and forcing them to use only the flight 
instruments simulating the conditions of low ceiling of clouds, heavy fog, night, 
and other instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). 
• Pilots must rely on instruments for awareness. 
• Can increase safety margin of evaluating approach scenarios at a much higher 
altitude—while presenting a lower altitude reality for the pilot via the flight deck 
• As a form of experimental deception, expect increased scrutiny from internal and 
external review boards. 
• Presenting virtual terrain and weather on airborne flight deck. 
We anticipate NextGen changes to create additional benefit cases for linking facilities and 
aircraft since roles and responsibilities between pilots and ATC will become more co-dependent 
and traffic is anticipated to be more dense.  For NextGen operations, the interaction between the 
pilots, aircraft and ATC will become much more interdependent.   Further, it is envisioned that 
some of the interaction will be mediated by ground and airborne automated systems, adding a 
new class of A&A-management systems and interactions for which the pilots must maintain 
awareness and proficiency. 
Linked simulators allow researchers to evaluate the 2nd or even 3rd order effects of a more 
condensed and interdependent air traffic management system. For example, the repercussions of 
a delayed ATC clearance or a pilot’s failure to notify ATC of a deviation may be far more 
disruptive in NextGen operations; if a pilot deviates from a clearance in NextGen operations, it 
will most likely have a far more intrusive effect on the neighboring traffic and the air traffic 
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controller trying to manage them. Traditional (e.g., unlinked) simulators can be used to evaluate 
human-machine interaction issues (SA, vigilance, workload, usability, etc.), and human-human 
issues (CRM, etc.).  The key advantage to linked facility testing is that it provides another layer 
of fidelity with a broader scope that is commensurate with the future vision for a more 
“connected” and interdependent NAS.  Specifically, the ability to evaluate large scale A&A-
management issues, related to distributed automation and control, and their effect on the entire 
air traffic system. 
Determining Simulation Requirements and Test Planning 
Determining simulation requirements is based upon an assumed approach for identifying and 
testing pilot awareness of complex subsystem states involving A&A management. The approach 
includes: 1) identifying hazardous scenarios, 2) identifying fragile human-system interaction 
points that could compromise awareness and 3) considering the span of modeling and simulation 
environments that may be used to examine scenarios prior to operational service. The approach 
is expanded on below and illustrated by two examples from published accident reports and one 
example of future operations.  
Identifying Hazardous Scenarios 
The analysis follows the STAMP methodology [49] of first identifying high level hazards 
(collision, Loss of Control (LOC), Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) etc.) and then 
identifying control actions that could lead to them. This is done for each of the flight phases 
(takeoff, climb, cruise etc.) and considering the major aircraft systems that are relevant to that 
phase in order to narrow the problem scope. For example, the braking system is not relevant 
during the climb/cruise decent phases but is during takeoff and landing. Conversely, incorrect 
thrust reverse actuation is potentially hazardous during all phases. The analysis leads to the 
identification of hazardous scenarios that determine the required simulation facility capabilities 
and the span of test cases and conditions. The simulation will then have two roles, 1) to first 
confirm the hazard potential and 2) to test system modifications (i.e. additional requirements) 
designed to mitigate the identified hazards. 
During this analysis, the pilot is considered as one node of the system; the pilot is able to 
provide/not provide, provide too early/too late the control actions that could lead to the high level 
hazard. Such ‘errors’ by the pilot can be caused by loss of SA, mode confusion; or stated more 
generally, the loss of synchronization between the actual system state or mode and the pilot’s 
mental model of system state, such as can occur during A&A transfers. 
Identifying Fragile Human-System Interaction Points 
Current practice relies heavily on the expert judgment of system engineers and test pilots to 
identify unsafe scenarios and actions; however, this method is inherently limited by biases which 
can lead them to discount highly improbable but critical tasks such as those identified in the 
JCAST report (2008).  Mechanized approaches dispassionately evaluate system characteristics, 
ignoring the relative frequency of certain system states and without human biases.  For example, 
Rushby suggests a model checking method to identify points where there is likely to be a 
mismatch between the pilot’s mental model and airplane state, inducing automation surprise in 
the MD-88 autopilot [44].   A possible mechanized approach is to identify test scenarios where 
disconnect is likely and map out the mode logic and all of its transitions in a state machine 
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representation for a given automated system and then ‘run’ a set of pilot mental model heuristics 
against it to identify violations.  Experts would develop heuristics that are representative of pilot 
expectations and biases while being diagnostic to identify areas of disconnect.  The assumption 
is that, even under ideal conditions, some automation logic or mode transition behavior could 
violate pilot expectations.   
The output of this approach would identify points where awareness (e.g. the perceived state) is 
likely to deviate from the actual state.  The project team would evaluate the results to determine: 
1. For each point, do they believe these are likely to pose awareness problems?  If not, 
document rationale.  If so, proceed to Step 2. 
2. Whether new requirement(s) would be warranted.  If so, develop a new system 
requirement that addresses the identified issue.  If not, proceed to Step 3. 
3. Consider a HITL evaluation to test whether issue does in fact pose an awareness issue for 
pilots. 
Modeling and Simulation 
When studying human-system interaction, the number of variables that can influence human 
performance is often too large to allow empirical assessment of all the possibilities. This is 
especially true when studying complex systems or complex cognitive constructs.  Computer-
based modeling of human performance could identify edge of the envelope situations that are 
unlikely to be considered by traditional analyses. 
Computer-based modeling of human behavior is very difficult and itself requires verification, so 
typically multiple levels of simulation fidelity are employed to achieve confidence in the 
computer based modeling results. The selection of model or simulator is specific to the hazard 
under investigation. It is the initial safety analysis that provides the initial hazards which are then 
refined by process iterations, employing the appropriate models and simulators as required. 
A synergistic approach to studying A&A transfer issues is assumed here that includes: 1) model-
based design and safety analysis and 2) simulation within a simulation facility or group of linked 
facilities that include HITL evaluation. Recognizing that high fidelity simulator time is 
expensive, as much of the V&V as possible is performed in the lower cost PC-based 
environments; this also serves to maximize the productivity of the high fidelity simulators. The 
generic scheme is shown in Error! Reference source not found.. The process is iterative in that 
t may be entered and left at any point. Throughout this process, additional requirements will 
emerge which can be considered by the project team in a process similar to the one described 
above. 
Cost/Benefit of Simulator Testing 
A cost/benefit analysis is integral to decisions regarding required level of test environment 
fidelity (see Appendix C: Selected Simulation Facilities at FAA and NASA).  See Section: 
Anticipated Impact of Using Linked Ground/Flight Testing , for a detailed description of the 
cost/benefit analysis.  Once system elements involved with A&A management and that are of 
concern have been identified, they should be tested. A cost/benefit analysis can provide some 
guidance on how to configure the testing setup. This can help streamline the process by scoping 
the testing elements that are integrated to be commensurate with testing objectives, in this case 
the cognitive fidelity related to maintaining SA (for A&A management elements).  
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Example Applications of the Methodology 
Table 2 provides a list of selected accidents where loss of airplane awareness was a proximate 
cause. We expand on two representative examples and use these to discuss simulation design 
issues and considerations. 
China Airlines Airbus A300B4-622R, Nagoya Japan (1994) 
The first example [30] illustrates a case where the crew lost awareness of the autopilot mode 
during a landing, causing them to attempt to manually oppose the autopilot. No equipment 
failures contributed to this accident. 
Accident Summary: On approach to Nagoya airport, the go-around lever was accidentally and 
unknowingly engaged. This accidental mode selection caused the autopilot to command the 
Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer (THS) to apply full nose up trim and increase thrust. Unaware 
of the go around mode being selected or the full nose up trim applied by the THS, the First 
Officer (F/O) attempted to resume the expected attitude and flight path by applying forward 
pressure to the control column. In the go around mode, the aural warning of THS motion was 
inhibited by design and therefore the crew did not get notification of the mode selection. The 
aircraft continued to climb with decreasing speed and increasing angle of attack (AOA) until it 
stalled and then rapidly descended and crashed. The aircraft was a total loss and 264 of the 271 
occupants were killed. 
A previous Airbus service bulletin (SB) had been issued on the autopilot to disconnect if a large 
force was applied to the control column whilst above 400 ft and in go-around mode. The SB had 
not been implemented on this aircraft and did not identify itself as safety related and was 
therefore categorized by China Airlines as an ‘on maintenance’ item. 
This accident has elements of loss of awareness (go-around mode confusion) and A&A transfer 
conditions (automatic full nose up trim in go-around mode). 
Following the steps previously discussed: 
1. Identifying hazardous scenarios:  Hazard analysis for autopilot would identify control 
actions across phases of flights.  For approach phase, incorrect pilot input would be 
accidental actuation of go-around lever, actuating TOGA autopilot mode. 
2. Identifying Fragile Human-System Interaction Points:  Mapping of mode logic space 
would reveal inhibition of aural THS alert during approach as a fragile state.  Mechanized 
approach would more likely identify this than SME since it involves an accidental 
actuation that most expert pilots would not even consider. 
3. Modeling and Simulation Scenario generation (approach, go around selection, over-ride 
of THS pitch up). Two crew with one being experimental confederate, the other being the 
pilots whose responses are under evaluation.  Confederate is necessary to “accidentally” 
activate go-around lever. 
4. Cost/Benefit Analysis:  Simulator elements critical to A&A aspects of ASA would 
include conformal visual and auditory representation of flight deck, full motion to 
provide some feedback regarding trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) motion, part-task 
to support approach phase evaluation;  Results:  part-task, ground-based, full motion 
simulator with configurable glass would be sufficient. 
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Simulation Environment: The scenario leading to this accident could be simulated in a full 
motion simulator such as those routinely used for pilot training. There would not be any need for 
external inputs such as traffic or weather.  The results from this test would likely indicate the 
hazard potential of this scenario and highlight that 1) the aural warning inhibit of THS motion in 
go around mode and 2) lack of automatic autopilot disconnect when excessive forward pressure 
was applied to the control column in go around mode were potential hazards. This realization 
could then lead to a reconsideration of system requirements and inform what other 
requirement(s) would mitigate the hazard. At a next higher level, the scenario could also be 
confirmed to be hazardous on a real aircraft by artificially moving ground level to a safe altitude 
and performing the identified scenario. 
Turkish Airlines Boeing 737-800, Schiphol Airport, Holland (2009) 
The second example [40] concerns a situation that was initially caused by a system failure in turn 
causing the crew to lose SA. This accident also revealed a previously unknown flaw in the 
design of the autopilot in relation to how primary/secondary radar altimeter information is used. 
Accident Summary:  During an approach at 1950 feet, a faulty captain-side (left) radio altimeter 
suddenly failed, causing the autopilot to believe the altitude was -8ft. This caused the autothrottle 
to (correctly) decrease engine power to the ‘retard flare’ low power setting. This should only 
occur during flare-out at 27ft, just prior to touch down. This failure should have logged an error 
and transferred data sourcing to the right-side radio altimeter, which was reading correctly.  It 
did not and continued to be the source of altitude data for the autothrottle and other systems. The 
crew had no understanding (loss of SA) of the conflicting effect on the autothrottle of an 
undetected failure of one radio altimeter whilst the other continued to perform correctly. 
The PF was the F/O (right-seat) and therefore the autopilot in control was also the right-side. The 
right-side autopilot received altitude data from the still functioning right-side radio altimeter and 
thus attempted to keep the aircraft flying on the glide path for as long as possible. This meant 
that, unnoticed by the crew, the aircraft’s nose continued to rise, creating an increasing AOA as 
the autopilot attempted to maintain lift as the airspeed reduced. 
The aircraft continued to descend and slow until the stick shaker stall warning activated. When 
the stick shaker went off, the captain took control. There seemed to be some confusion between 
the captain and F/O in this transfer of control (authority). The F/O released the throttles, which 
caused the autothrottle to return to the idle setting, correctly according to its design. There was 
some delay until the captain disconnected the autothrottle and commanded full thrust. By this 
time there was insufficient altitude (350ft) or forward speed available to effect recovery. 
The basic cause was that the left-side radio altimeter failed undetected thus defeating the dual 
redundancy. The deeper cause was the system design that allowed the autothrottle and autopilot 
to operate from a failed radio altimeter sensor and the consequential loss of crew SA following 
this failure. Had the crew been aware of the failure mode and its implications for this particular 
system design, recovery action could have been taken in time to avoid the accident. The same 
analysis steps would be followed as in the previous example. 
Simulation Environment: The scenario leading to this accident could be simulated using the 
same process described in the previous example. A safety analysis and scenario generation 
would be necessary to configure the simulation setup for the necessary test conditions. 
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Trajectory Based Operations (TBO) 
As an example of simulation-assisted safety assessment of A&A-management scenarios, we 
consider trajectory based operations (TBO) [51][52]. TBO is a major component of future 
NextGen and SESAR that frees operators from many of the constraints of current operations and 
flow management. Pre-defined 4D (i.e. position, height and time) trajectories are defined for 
aircraft to fly based on the operator’s view of an optimum (e.g. lowest cost) trajectory. This 
functionality is provided by the use of existing FMS systems installed on most Part 23 aircraft 
and a considerable proportion of Part 25 aircraft. TBO is primarily aimed at en-route operations, 
though it has potential to be extended in TMA operations in conjunction with planned merging 
and spacing operational improvements. 
TBO will allow operators to define pre-planned trajectories that are coordinated by air traffic 
management (ATM) using system-wide information management (SWIM) to assure conflict free 
trajectories. Trajectories will be based initially on nominal conditions, not allowing for external 
events, e.g. weather, airport closure, in flight emergencies. Off-nominal conditions will require 
that the pre-defined trajectories of many aircraft be amended in a coordinated fashion to remain 
conflict free. We may therefore consider that if one aircraft requires a trajectory change then 
several others may be required to alter their trajectories also. 
This implies that aircraft automation may perform the trajectory change and that all affected 
pilots must retain SA throughout. Trajectory changes may be temporary e.g. a response to a 
TCAS RA or permanent such that the aircraft follows a new trajectory to its destination. There is 
obvious potential for A&A transfers that could lead to loss of SA under this circumstance. 
Scenarios of this type are potential candidates for the use of linked simulation facilities during 
the development of aircraft systems, TBO procedures and ground based ATM facilities such as 
SWIM. 
To investigate scenarios that could lead to loss of SA under off-nominal TBO situations, an 
analysis and simulation setup would be needed that provides or links to the following facilities. 
• ATM and Traffic simulation incorporating SWIM. 
• Weather feed. 
• OTW view, SVS, HUD as required. 
• Navigation equipment (e.g. GPS, FMS, AFCS). 
• Separation assurance equipment (e.g. ADS-B, TCAS/ACAS). 
• Communications equipment (e.g. Voice, CPDLC). 
• Representative crewed flight deck with supporting autoflight components. 
As in the previous examples, identifying hazards generates specific scenarios that are confirmed 
in the simulation and lead to additional safety requirements for implementation in systems and 
procedures. 
Many scenarios could be generated, e.g. 
• A TCAS RA causes the aircraft to deviate from the approved trajectory. 
• Coordinated avoidance action by other aircraft in the vicinity in order to maintain minimum 
separation. 
• Re-planned trajectory to accommodate an off-nominal situation (e.g. airport closure, airspace 
avoidance) with concomitant changes to other affected aircraft trajectories. 
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After these assessments, a cost/benefit analysis can inform the decision on which simulation 
components are appropriate for the different scenarios.  For example, in the case of the TCAS 
RA scenario, it could be determined that the potential safety cost of live traffic does not warrant 
the benefit of realism.  Accordingly, ground-based traffic simulators could provide virtual traffic 
for an airborne AC for the HITL evaluation.  In addition to the safety afforded, more 
experimental control could be exercised over the simulated traffic and subsequent coordinated 
response to a TCAS RA.   
Requirements for Linked Simulation Facilities 
Clearly simulation facilities need to be selected and configured to test for vulnerabilities to 
specific hazards; there is no generic simulation specification that covers all possible hazards. The 
use of simulators is beneficial for confirmation that a given test case will produce a system 
hazard. Simulator is a broad term that encompasses the small and focused, e.g. a symbology 
simulator, to large airspace simulators that may include both ground based and airborne assets. 
The intent is that low level modeling tools would perform in ‘fast time’ and the complex and 
expensive ‘slow time’ simulators would be confined to a confirmatory role. 
Figure 2 illustrates two classes of simulation facility spanning fidelity and missions: 
• A computer based tool that executes a given model and provide results from given test cases. 
• A high-level group of linked simulators that represent one or more cockpits including pilots, 
at least one ATC/ATM facility including controllers, and external feeds of operational data. 
This class of simulator requires that it be presented with a test case in the form of a scenario 
definition. 
A review of NASA and FAA data has located a considerable number of US facilities that offer 
high level simulation facilities of the types mentioned above. These are listed in Appendix C: 
Selected Simulation Facilities at FAA and NASA. 
The following are representative capabilities that are suggested but the subset of these required 
will be dependent on the precise problem being investigated. 
• Pilot symbology generator. 
• Formal methods analysis of state machine representations of a multi-LRU system, e.g. 
theorem prover, model checker, abstraction. 
• Full motion 6-DOF large transport cockpit with representative equipment, e.g. displays 
(EFB, SVS, HUD), mode control panel, standby instruments. 
• Weather data feed. 
• ATC communications utilizing voice and CPDLC. 
• Multi-target generator for TIS-B and ADS-B traffic data, live from airborne assets or from 
other linked simulation facilities. 
• Flight data, communications and voice recording. 
• Pilot, co-pilot eye tracking. 
• Fault injection to simulate functional failure of individual high level functions, e.g. blank 
displays, primary power loss, hydraulic pressure loss, sensor fault/icing. 
When considered for use during V&V, simulator capabilities should be evaluated based on their 
costs and benefits.  Costs include the development time and resources required to integrate some 
simulator capability; benefits include improved performance for a dimension of interest such as 
cognitive fidelity, coverage of problem space, and safety. In general, cost is operationalized as a 
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categorical, rough order of magnitude estimate of dollars costs of operating costs of, personnel 
time to integrate with, accessibility to simulation capability, and project schedule impact. 
Another testing cost is exposure to unsafe conditions.  While it is difficult to quantify this in 
terms of dollar costs, we can assume it is desirable to avoid expose testing personnel and the 
public to unsafe operating situations. 
The overall setup of the suggested scheme is shown in Figure 4. The boxed section represents 
conventional current practice except that we recommend that STAMP be additionally used to 
augment the current safety assessment processes suggested in ARP-4761 in order to improve 
hazard analysis under off-nominal conditions. Many hazards will be identified and removed 
within this conventional process without the need for simulation. Problems typified by A&A 
failures are typically very difficult to find through this conventional process, 
The technique is focused on a particular system defined by some system boundary. This is not an 
overly restrictive constraint since the boundary is selected to contain the system of interest. This 
is necessary to scope the problem and to generate scenarios that are hazardous for the system so 
defined. System may here be considered to consist of a subset of crew, LRUs, operating 
procedures, protocols and if necessary, the surrounding managerial structures. Repeated 
applications of this process are needed to walk the system boundaries out so far as is considered 
prudent. 
The benefits arising from this suggested approach are that defining the hazardous scenarios 
results in the creation of specific, focused test cases being provided to the simulation setup so 
that expected outcomes are known in advance. Results that differ from expected indicate that 
new system requirements are necessary to avoid or mitigate the hazard. 
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Figure 4 – Simulation Environment 
Conclusions 
Based on our review, current industry practices do not specifically and systematically address 
awareness of authority-/autonomy-management dynamics and modes.  More importantly, current 
engineering processes tend to be system-centric only rather than considering human-centric 
along with a systems perspective.  As a result, system designs fail to account for issues that arise 
due to poor human-system interaction.  The commonly held assumption is that, ensuring the safe 
and reliable operation of system will result in the safe and reliable performance of the operator. 
Unfortunately, this system-centered approach does not accurately account for the operator’s role 
in the overall safety of the system. An analysis reported in [4] concluded that incidents and 
accidents can occur even when systems are operating correctly.  What is needed is a systematic 
process for identifying potential human-system interaction failures which can be used to define 
verifiable human factors requirements. 
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High level human factors requirements have been invoked by regulatory agencies across a 
variety of domains (e.g., DoD, FAA, NASA, NRC, FDA).  However, human factors 
requirements, especially those involving cognitive constructs such as situation awareness pose 
unique challenges that are not currently accommodated by existing V&V processes. 
To address this, a more rigorous and comprehensive V&V methodology is discussed for complex 
automated systems that minimize the potential for loss of airplane state awareness by flight 
crews. It is a synergistic approach that combines and builds upon two methods, 1) model-based 
design and safety analysis and 2) simulation within a simulation facility or group of linked 
facilities that include human-in-the-loop. Recognizing that simulator time can be expensive, this 
scheme puts as much of the load as possible into the lower cost computer-based environment and 
therefore maximize the productivity of the high level simulators. The selection of model or 
simulator is specific to the hazard under investigation. It is the initial safety analysis that 
provides the initial hazards which are then refined by process iterations, employing the 
appropriate models and simulators as required. 
A cost/benefit analysis is integral to decisions regarding the required level of test environment 
fidelity.  Once you have identified system elements involved with A&A management that are of 
concern and should be tested, a cost/benefit analysis can provide some guidance on how to 
configure the testing setup. This can help streamline the process by scoping the testing elements 
that are integrated to be commensurate with testing objectives, in this case the cognitive fidelity 
related to managing A&A and maintaining ASA.  
Given the added complexity of resource dependencies and system integration, linked air-ground 
testing will almost always increase the cost of a test, relative to either ground-based only and 
airborne only,  in terms of schedule, budget, resources availability, and personnel.  However, we 
anticipate NextGen changes to create additional benefit cases for linking facilities and aircraft 
since roles and responsibilities between pilots and ATC will become more co-dependent and 
traffic is anticipated to be more dense.  For NextGen operations, the interaction between the 
pilots, aircraft and ATC will become much more interdependent.   Further, it is envisioned that 
some of the interaction will be mediated by ground and airborne automated systems, adding a 
new class of A&A-management systems and interactions for which the pilots must maintain 
awareness and proficiency.  Linked simulators allow researchers to evaluate the 2nd or even 3rd 
order effects of a more condensed and interdependent air traffic management system. For 
example, the repercussions of a delayed ATC clearance or a pilot’s failure to notify ATC of a 
deviation may be far more disruptive in NextGen operations 
Determining simulation requirements is based upon an assumed approach for identifying and 
testing pilot awareness of complex subsystem states involving A&A management. The approach 
includes: 1) identifying hazardous scenarios, 2) identifying fragile human-system interaction 
points that could compromise awareness and 3) considering the span of modeling and simulation 
environments that may be used to examine scenarios prior to operational service. 
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Appendix A: Accident/Incident Reports 
 
• Aircraft Accident Investigation Commission, “China Airlines Airbus A300B4-622R, 
Nagoya Airport, Nagoya, Japan, April 26, 1994,” The Ministry of Transport of Japan, 
July 19, 1996. Flight 140 
• NTSB, “Factual Report - Predator B UA Crash Nogales, AZ, 25th April 2006,” 
CHI06MA121, October 31, 2007. 
• NTSB, “American Airlines Flight 965 B757 at Cali, Bogota, December 20, 1995,” 
DCA96RA020, 2003. 
• NTSB, “Northwest Airlines A320 Flight No NW188, N374NW, Overflight of 
Minneapolis Airport, October 21, 2009,” DCA10IA001, March 18, 2010. 
• NTSB, “Loss of Control on Approach Colgan Air (operating as Continental Connection) 
Flight 3407 Bombardier DHC-8-400, N200WQ Clarence Center, New York February 12, 
2009,” DCA09MA027, February 2, 2010. 
• EASA, DCA09RA052, F-GZCP  Report, Air France 447, Airbus A330-200, June 1, 2009  
• Kenya Minister of Transport Report, Kenya Airways KQA 507 B737-800 Douala; 05-
MAY-2007 
• NTSB, DCA03IA005,  Icelandair 662, 757-200 near Baltimore, MD on 20-OCT-2002 
 
ASRS Reports 
• 896575 
• 898667 
• 932793 
• 937132 
• 113722 
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Appendix B: Cost/Benefit Analysis for MCP Testing Example 
 
The following table describes the proposed analytic process to evaluate the benefit of different 
testing elements, in terms of cognitive fidelity, for an evaluation of an MCP with regard to pilot 
airplane state awareness.  The columns to the right of, and including, High Workload, represent 
factors known to impact airplane state awareness.  The rows include testing elements that project 
teams could include in the evaluation.  Benefit is defined as the number of factors rated as 
Medium (M) or High (H) impact to the factors, as rated by a Human Factors expert with over 15 
years of industry experience. The estimated benefit is considered relative to the Cost Estimate to 
determine whether the testing element would be Required (R) or Optional (O). 
 
Testing Component Type Test Setup 
Option 1: MCP 
Evaluation
Cost 
Estimate
# Med or 
High Impact
High 
Workload
Stress Distraction Complex 
Display
Subtle Mode 
Change
Complex 
Automation 
Logic
Test Pilot 
knowledge/  
skil l  Base
Conformity of 
fl ight deck 
interface
Automation Simulation Test Software Platform R M 6 M M M H H H n/a n/a
Configurable All Glass Flight Deck 
Interface
Test Software Platform
R M 5 M M H H M n/a n/a n/a
Conformal flight deck user interfaces Test Software Platform
O H 6 M M H H M n/a n/a H
Part-Task Simulation Test Scenario Element R M 5 M M M M M n/a n/a n/a
Full Mission Simulation (high fidelity 
in procedures, actors, and roles)
Test Scenario Element
H 5 M M H M M n/a n/a n/a
Realistic Flight Deck Workload 
Support
Test Scenario Element
R M 4 H H H n/a H n/a n/a n/a
All Glass Flight Deck Interface Test Hardware Platform M
ATC Operator Station Test Hardware Platform n/a 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
ATM HIL Simulator Test Hardware Platform n/a 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Conformal physical hardware 
interfaces
Test Hardware Platform
M 1 L L n/a L L n/a n/a H
Desktop Simulator Test Hardware Platform L 0 n/a n/a n/a L n/a n/a n/a L
High Physical Fidelity (displays, 
controls, AC dynamics)
Test Hardware Platform
H 2 L L L M n/a n/a n/a M
Fixed Based Simulator Test Hardware Platform R M 3 M M M n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Motion Platform Test Hardware Platform H 1 L M L n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Flight Data Test Data H 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Airport conditions Simulated Test Scenario Element M 0 L L L n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
ATC Simulation Simulated Test Scenario Element M 2 L M H n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
ATM Simulation Simulated Test Scenario Element M 0 L L L n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Traffic Simulator Simulated Test Scenario Element O L 3 M H M n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Voice Communications Simulated Test Scenario Element O H 3 H H H n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Weather Simulator Simulated Test Scenario Element O L 3 M H M n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Connectivity to Remote Simulation 
Capabilities
Connectiviy
O M 3 M M M n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Linked Air to Groud via AC Telemetry Connectiviy
M 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Live Traffic Linked to Ground Station Connectiviy
M 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
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Appendix C: Selected Simulation Facilities at FAA and NASA 
 
Location Lab Component Capabilities 
FAA Airport Traffic 
Control Tower 
Simulation Platform 
(ATCT Simulator 
Platform) 
  Based on DESIREE simulator 
infrastructure 
Can connect to other simulations 
9.73 inch HD TV for 270 deg OTW 
view 
FAA Airport Traffic 
Control Tower 
Simulation Platform 
(ATCT Simulator 
Platform) 
  Realistic airport conditions (time), 
visual conditions, weather, and AC 
emergencies 
Configurable tower controller table 
with their tools (ASDE-X or D-BRITE 
display) 
FAA Distributed 
Environment for 
Simulation, Rapid 
Engineering, and 
Experimentation 
(DESIREE) 
Rapid engineering 
of UI and 
functionality 
 
FAA Distributed 
Environment for 
Simulation, Rapid 
Engineering, and 
Experimentation 
(DESIREE) 
Simulation Engine Most realistic and advanced simulator 
of en route and terminal ATC systems 
Replicates functions and user 
interfaces of Display System 
Replacement (DSR) and Standard 
Terminal Automation Replacement 
System (STARS) 
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Location Lab Component Capabilities 
FAA Distributed 
Environment for 
Simulation, Rapid 
Engineering, and 
Experimentation 
(DESIREE) 
Simulation 
infrastructure 
 
FAA NextGen Integration 
and Evaluation 
Capability (NIEC) 
MIT Lincoln Lab 
Tower Flight Data 
Manager 
Prototype 
FAA NextGen Integration 
and Evaluation 
Capability (NIEC) 
NextGen 
Integration and 
Evaluation 
Capability (NIEC) 
End to end NAS ATM environment 
consisting of numerous integrated 
legacy and NextGen ATM capabilities 
and simulations 
UAS, Tower, Air Traffic, Surface Mgt 
System, WXR, TMU, AOC, and 
Research Cockpit Simulator 
FAA NextGen Integration 
and Evaluation 
Capability (NIEC) 
    
FAA Technical Operations 
Human-in-the Loop 
Simulator 
  High fidelity, HITL simulator to 
examine human performance in 
Operations Control Centers 
FAA William J. Hughes 
Technical Center 
Research 
Development and 
HF Laboratory 
(RDHFL) 
Experiment Operator Station (EOS) 
Can be linked with other EOS 
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Location Lab Component Capabilities 
FAA William J. Hughes 
Technical Center 
Target Generation 
Facility (TGF) 
Simulation Engine: Dynamic real-time 
air traffic simulator capability to 
generate realistic AC trajectories and 
associated digital radar message for 
AC in simulated airspace environment 
Up to 600 targets (400 piloted) can be 
generated in one or more concurrent 
simulator environments 
Multiple terminal, en-route, and 
Oceanic airspaces can be simulated 
individually or simultaneously 
FAA William J. Hughes 
Technical Center 
Target Generation 
Facility (TGF) 
Simulated Weather 
Inject standard day atmospheric model 
WXR into aircraft dynamics model 
(ADM) will affect the dynamics and 
movement of AC throughout the 
simulated airspace 
Winds at different altitudes, 
precipitation 
FAA William J. Hughes 
Technical Center 
Target Generation 
Facility (TGF) 
Primarily for HITL simulator 
FAA William J. Hughes 
Technical Center 
Target Generation 
Facility (TGF) 
Realistic traffic flows and voice 
communications created in real time 
by pilots operating the simulated TGF 
AC in response to ATC instructions 
FAA William J. Hughes 
Technical Center 
Target Generation 
Facility (TGF) 
Support all major Air Traffic Labs of 
The Tech Center are supported 
including: E-Route DSR Lab, Stars 
Terminal Lab, EN-Route Integration 
and Interoperability Facility (IIF), and 
the RDHFL) 
FAA/ 
ERAU 
Florida NextGen Test 
Bed 
ATC Simulators Connectivity to NIEC via Aviation 
SimNet 
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Location Lab Component Capabilities 
Govt, 
University, 
Industry 
Various Weather Data Sharing via Aviation SimNet 
JPDO   Test bed  
Mitre Mitre ATC Simulators Connectivity to NIEC via Aviation 
SimNet 
NASA Aeronautics UAS Integration 
in the National 
Airspace System 
(NAS) Project, 
Integrated Test 
and Evaluation 
(IT&E) subj 
project 
The IT&E sub-project is building a 
combined live and virtual (simulated) 
real-time human-in-the-loop 
distributed test environment in order to 
facilitate the evaluation of candidate 
technologies that will enable more 
routine UAS operations in the NAS 
NASA Flight Deck Display 
Research Lab 
(FDDRL) 
ATC center Simulations of flight deck automation 
tools w/o adding physical components 
and personnel 
NASA Flight Deck Display 
Research Lab 
(FDDRL) 
Pseudo pilot 
station 
(Confederate) 
 
NASA SimLabs ATC Simulators Connectivity to NIEC via Aviation 
SimNet 
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Location Lab Component Capabilities 
NASA UAS Integration in the 
National Airspace 
System (NAS) Project, 
Integrated Test and 
Evaluation (IT&E) 
subj project 
This capability 
will be used in 
future tests to 
reduce technical 
barriers related to 
the safety and 
operational 
challenges 
associated with 
enabling routine 
UAS access to the 
NAS.  The Project 
will continue to 
expand its LVC 
test capability by 
extending its 
interface to 
facilities at NASA 
Langley and 
Glenn Research 
Centers and 
possibly the 
FAA’s William J. 
Hughes Technical 
Center. 
 
NASA 
Ames 
Research 
Center 
Airspace Operations 
Laboratory 
MACS/ ADRS 
Simulates 
Architect: 
Aeronautical 
Datalink and 
Radar Simulator 
(ADRS) 
The ADRS is the central 
communication process enabling 
information sharing between MACS 
stations and other "external" 
simulation components 
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Location Lab Component Capabilities 
NASA 
Ames 
Research 
Center 
Aviation Systems 
Division 
Air Traffic 
Control (ATC) 
Simulation 
laboratories 
The ATC Simulation Lab enables 
NASA researchers to perform 
complex human-in-the-loop 
simulations to evaluate the 
performance of new concepts, 
procedures, and technologies and 
determine how well such technologies 
perform with the addition of humans 
in the decision-making loop 
NASA 
Ames 
Research 
Center 
Aviation Systems 
Division 
Air Traffic 
Management 
Automation 
Laboratory 
(ATMAL) 
The Air Traffic Management 
Automation Laboratory (ATMAL) is a 
facility designed to support air traffic 
management research including the 
development and testing of Center 
TRACON Automation System 
(CTAS). At the heart of the ATMAL 
is a large multi-user computational 
environment consisting of over 100 
UNIX workstations. 
NASA 
Ames 
Research 
Center 
Aviation Systems 
Division 
Verification and 
Validation (V&V) 
CTAS as a research platform is 
continuously being improved. NASA 
and the FAA have installed prototype 
CTAS tools in several stages at air 
traffic control facilities serving the 
Dallas/Fort Worth airports. To support 
the use of CTAS at these field sites 
and confirm the functionality of the 
research software, NASA has 
developed a software release process 
to introduce new and improved CTAS 
functionality. As new CTAS 
functionality is developed in the Air 
Traffic Management Automation 
Laboratory (ATMAL), it is 
periodically captured and 
"downloaded" into the V&V 
Laboratory. 
54 
 
Location Lab Component Capabilities 
NASA 
Ames 
Research 
Center 
Aviation Systems 
Division 
Virtual Airspace 
Simulation 
Technologies 
PROJECT - Real 
Time (VAST-RT) 
Simulation and modeling for Air 
Traffic concepts 
NASA 
Ames 
Research 
Center 
Flight Deck Display 
Research Lab 
(FDDRL) 
R&D of airside 
displays and 
interfaces 
 
NASA 
Ames 
Research 
Center 
SimLabs Air Traffic Labs 
(ATM) 
Simulate air traffic operations 
NASA 
Ames 
Research 
Center 
SimLabs Crew-Vehicle 
Systems Research 
Facility (CVSRF) 
Realistic interfaces 
NASA 
Ames 
Research 
Center 
SimLabs Distributed 
experiments with 
UAS 
 
NASA 
Ames 
Research 
Center 
SimLabs FutureFlight 
Central (FFC) 
Immersive visual environment for 
ATC/ATM simulations 
NASA 
Ames 
Research 
Center 
SimLabs High level 
Architecture 
Connects Simulation components 
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Location Lab Component Capabilities 
NASA 
Ames 
Research 
Center 
SimLabs Linked Air to 
Ground 
SimLabs integrated AC telemetry data 
from NASA Dryden's Ikhana 
Unmanned AC System into a Live, 
virtual, and constructive (LVC) flight 
test environment 
NASA 
Ames 
Research 
Center 
SimLabs Vertical Motion 
Simulator (VMS) 
Unsurpassed motion 
NASA 
Ames 
Research 
Center 
  Remote Cockpit 
Simulator 
Connectivity to NIEC via Aviation 
SimNet 
NASA 
Dryden 
Flight 
Research 
Center 
Gulfstream III: G-III 
C-20A Research Test 
bed 
Data Collection 
and Processing 
System (DCAPS) 
Enables processing, distributing, 
displaying and archiving AC flight 
data and customers' experimental data 
in real time 
NASA 
Dryden 
Flight 
Research 
Center 
Gulfstream III: G-III 
C-20A Research Test 
bed 
Embedded 
instrumentation 
system 
Automated configuration setups to 
reduce engineering support for each 
mission 
NASA 
Dryden 
Flight 
Research 
Center 
  Ikhan Unmanned 
AC System (UAS) 
 
NASA 
Langley 
Research 
Center 
The Flight Simulation 
Facilities 
Cockpit Motion 
Facility 
Motion and fixed based--4 fixed sites 
+ 1 motion site-- 6 DOF 76 inch 
synergistic motion system; simulators 
are moved to different sites with 
overhead crane 
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Location Lab Component Capabilities 
NASA 
Langley 
Research 
Center 
The Flight Simulation 
Facilities 
Development and 
Test Simulator 
fixed-base, advanced all glass 
transport with programmable sidestick 
NASA 
Langley 
Research 
Center 
The Flight Simulation 
Facilities 
Differential 
Maneuvering 
Simulator 
Simulating two fighter or spacecraft 
maneuvering with respect to each 
other 
NASA 
Langley 
Research 
Center 
The Flight Simulation 
Facilities 
Generic Flight 
Deck 
All glass reconfigurable cockpit with 
programmable side-stick 
NASA 
Langley 
Research 
Center 
The Flight Simulation 
Facilities 
Integrated Flight 
Deck Simulator 
Full mission simulation capability 
NASA 
Langley 
Research 
Center 
The Flight Simulation 
Facilities 
Link to other 
simulation 
facilities at other 
NASA Centers, 
DOD facilities, 
FAA facilities, 
commercial 
facilities, and 
university 
facilities. 
 
NASA 
Langley 
Research 
Center 
The Flight Simulation 
Facilities 
Research Flight 
Deck Simulator 
All glass reconfigurable cockpit with 
programmable side-stick 
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Location Lab Component Capabilities 
NASA 
Langley 
Research 
Center 
The Flight Simulation 
Facilities 
Sims with one-of-
a-kind oculometer 
(eye tracking) 
technology for all 
classes of AC and 
spacecraft 
 
NASA 
Langley 
Research 
Center 
The Flight Simulation 
Facilities 
Test and 
Evaluation 
Simulator 
Reconfigurable to represent any type 
of vehicle; Orion Capsule or Lunar 
Lander recently 
NASA 
Langley 
Research 
Center 
  Remote Cockpit 
Simulator 
Connectivity to NIEC via Aviation 
SimNet 
NASA/ 
FAA 
North Texas Research 
Station (NTX) 
Collaborative 
effort between 
NASA Ames and 
several GAA 
organizations to 
support NextGen 
research 
Field evaluations 
NASA/ 
FAA 
North Texas Research 
Station (NTX) 
existing 
connection to the 
FAA WJHTC 
NextGen External 
Enclave 
 
National 
Weather 
Service 
(NWS) 
National Centers for 
Environmental 
Prediction (NCEP) 
Rapid Update 
Cycle (RUC-2) 
weather forecast 
model 
Inject weather into FAA Target 
Generation Facility (TGF) 
 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188
2.  REPORT TYPE 
Contractor Report
 4.  TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Assessing V&V Processes for Automation with Respect to Vulnerabilities 
to Loss of Airplane State Awareness  
5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
NNL06AA05B
 6.  AUTHOR(S)
Whitlow, Stephen; Wilkinson, Chris; Hamblin, Chris
 7.  PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
NASA Langley Research Center                     
Hampton, Virginia 23681                                
                                                                                                                                                  
 9.  SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, DC  20546-0001
 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
     REPORT NUMBER
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
NASA
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
Langley Technical Monitor: Steven D. Young
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Unclassified - Unlimited
Subject Category  06
Availability:  NASA CASI (443) 757-5802
19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
STI Help Desk (email:  help@sti.nasa.gov)
14. ABSTRACT
Automation has contributed substantially to the sustained improvement of aviation safety by minimizing the physical workload of the pilot and increasing 
operational efficiency. Nevertheless, in complex and highly automated aircraft, automation also has unintended consequences. As systems become more 
complex and the authority and autonomy (A&A) of the automation increases, human operators become relegated to the role of a system supervisor or 
administrator, a passive role not conducive to maintaining engagement and airplane state awareness (ASA). The consequence is that flight crews can often 
come to over rely on the automation, become less engaged in the human-machine interaction, and lose awareness of the automation mode under which the 
aircraft is operating. Likewise, the complexity of the system and automation modes may lead to poor understanding of the interaction between a mode of 
automation and a particular system configuration or phase of flight. These and other examples of mode confusion often lead to mismanaging the aircraft’s 
energy state or the aircraft deviating from the intended flight path. This report examines methods for assessing whether, and how, operational constructs 
properly assign authority and autonomy in a safe and coordinated manner, with particular emphasis on assuring adequate airplane state awareness by the flight 
crew and air traffic controllers in off-nominal and/or complex situations. 
15. SUBJECT TERMS
Aircraft safety; Airplane state awareness; Autonomy; Flight deck systems; Human factors; Pilot-vehicle interface; Situational 
awareness requirements
18. NUMBER
      OF 
      PAGES
62
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)
(443) 757-5802
a.  REPORT
U
c. THIS PAGE
U
b. ABSTRACT
U
17. LIMITATION OF 
      ABSTRACT
UU
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
3.  DATES COVERED (From - To)
5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
NNL12AC67T
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
 534723.02.02.07.20
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT
      NUMBER(S)
NASA/CR-2014-218246
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, 
gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this 
collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and 
Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA  22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person 
shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
1.  REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)
05 - 201401-
